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Abstract
Within the past decade people around the world have become progressively more
aware and interested in the new uses of digital technologies in movements for political
change. The technologies have given more people and groups access to information and
the tools needed to increase productivity and communication than in the past. As a result
of these new digital technologies, the number of people contributing to their civil
societies has radically increased.
My thesis questions: What is the value of digital activism in the process of
democratization around the world? How did those that succeed successfully use these
new technologies as opposed to the several others that have failed? Are the successful
practices replicable in other scenarios with a similar context? In studying, analyzing, and
evaluating digital activism, I attempt to determine how citizens can use digital
technologies more efficiently in order to exercise their political power in a more effective
manner.

Introduction
On January 17th, 2001 thousands of Filipinos gathered on Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue, a major crossroad in Manila, after having forwarded the text message “Go 2
EDSA. Wear blk” and “Full mblsn tday EDSA” to over seven million people. Within a
few days there were over a million people protesting the impeachment trial of President
Joseph Estrada for not using incriminating evidence during his trial.1 Thanks to the
public’s ability to coordinate such a fast and massive response, Estrada was impeached
three days later. The impeachment of Estrada was the first, but not final, time a form of
digital media was used to force out a national leader.
In the past few years several societies have used different forms of digital media
in order to revolt against their governments. As with all new technologies, it is important
to study the effects digital media has had on both communities and regimes in order to
attempt to predict its effects on other nation-states. Digital media can be defined as a
form of electronic communication in which users create communities to share
information, ideas, and other content via web-based and/or mobile technologies.2 My
thesis will question whether digital media tools create, aid, enhance, or hinder
democratization. I will observe the text message coordinated protest in the Philippines in
2001 as well as the Facebook Egyptian revolution in 2011 to support my findings. This
paper concludes that while digital media may not have been the cause of these
revolutions it has certainly aided and expanded the reach of the revolutions.

1

Clay Shirky, "The Political Power of Digital media," Foreign Affairs,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67038/clay-shirky/the-political-power-of-social-media.
2

"Dictionary and Thesaurus," Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com.

1

This is a very important and time sensitive topic in the field of international
relations. While democratization has been occurring for hundreds of years and has
equally been a topic worthwhile of research, it is just recently that technology, and more
importantly digital media, has been a factor in democratization. Politicians, news
anchors, and even bloggers have been concentrating on this topic increasingly as more
countries rise up against their governments.
Democratization is defined as the change to a government in which
the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly
through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections.3 To
begin I will examine democratization theories laid out by political scientists and
philosophers. Samuel Huntington in Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
discusses several causes of democratization including wealth, education, capitalism,
social equality, culture and foreign intervention. He also mentions three processes of
democratization. Transformation is a top-down change coming from within the
government. Transplacement is when the regime and government negotiate reform.
Replacement is when the regime breaks down or collapses.4 I will be primarily concerned
with the third process of democratization: replacement.
Huntington believes there have been three modern waves of democratization: first
during the 19th century, second after World War II, and third in the mid 1970’s.5 I would
like to further his studies by arguing that the fourth wave of democratization began in the
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new millennium with the rise of digital media and technology. While digital media has
not caused non-democratic nations to begin the democratization process, I believe that it
has offered a new means of communication for individuals to fight for their right.
Robert Dahl, a distinguished political scientist, has argued that in order for a
government to continue, all citizens must be able to “formulate their preferences” as well
as have their preferences be weighed equally regardless of the source.6 This is especially
relevant in situations in which citizens rise up against their governments using digital
media sources.
The Internet is not the first technology associated with freedom. Previous
inventions such as the printing press, telegraph, radio, telephone and computer all have
the ability to free individuals, as well as to assist their oppressors.7 However, unlike the
television, radio, and printing press, the Internet is both interactive and personalized to
allow users to share experiences online.8 Barry Wellman argues that social networks are
“profoundly transforming the nature of communities, sociality, and interpersonal
relations”.9 These networks enable the communication between different cultures by
sharing their values of communication despite and different values they may have.
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Although cultures may have opposing cultural values, these networks enable them to
share their values of communication and thus interact more easily.10
Digital technologies and applications are changing the way individuals,
governments, and non-governmental organizations are interacting today. They have given
more people and groups access to information and the tools needed to increase
productivity and communication than in the past. As a result of these new digital
technologies, the number of people contributing to their civil society has radically
increased.
In my thesis I will describe and define major social media technologies.
Facebook, a major social networking website, launched in 2004 for college students, and
has more than 600 million users as of January 2011.11 Facebook exists and thrives
because of people’s desire to share information with others. Twitter is a more recent
social networking website created in 2006 which operates as a microblog for users to
send and read messages. These messages, called Tweets, are text-based messages up to
140 characters that are used to connect people all over the globe. Freedom of expression
is essential for Twitter12. As Twitter blogged, “Some Tweets may facilitate positive
change in a repressed country, some make us laugh, some make us think, some downright
anger a vast majority of users”.13
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There are several other social media websites including the U.S.-made Wikipedia
and YouTube, the Chinese instant messaging service QQ, WikiLeaks whose servers are
located in Sweden, the Spanish social network Tuenti, the Korean social network Naver,
and Speak2Tweet, which is a voicemail transcription service for Twitter created by
Google and Twitter during the Egyptian revolutions. Mobile applications, networks, and
devices have also been included in digital media.
Digital technologies have several features that assist and enhance the
democratization process. In recent years digital media has become inherent in many
western societies and a crucial form of communication. These communities offer users
empowerment and nourish the ideals of a citizen-based form of democracy. Their speed
combined with their low costs allows activists to organize around concrete goals.14 These
tech savvy activists generally think of themselves as belonging to a global movement.
Their local activities become directly linked via photographs, articles, and sound clips to
problems around the world. These mediums also allow for a constant flow of information
in societies where the media is generally censored to permit only pro-government
messages. They also give a voice to those that have been silenced. It allows people to
share and gain information that is sometimes not available or is censored to give them a
false idea of what is happening in their country. Instead of a top down approach, as is
with most efforts, digital media allows for a more flexible coordination among people
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with minimal structure. This creates the ability to send information without managerial
control or formal organizations.15
Manuel Castells, a leading sociologist of information society and communications
research, argues that three features make networks most efficient. First, their flexibility
allows reconfiguration based on a changing environment while retaining original goals.
Second, scalability is the ability to expand or minimize without disruption. Third,
survivability is the networks ability to withstand attacks.16 Digital media emits these three
features.
Because of these characteristics users have the ability to form masses of 100,000
people in cities such as Ismailia with a population of 750,000 million.17 Without these
technologies groups might not be able to organize mobs of people large enough to have
an effect on their government. While larger groups do not always equal success, they do
make a larger impact. Also there is the possibility that if the crowds were not as large, the
government could re-group to fight back, stabilize the revolters, and repress their society.
Besides the technological advantages to using digital media in the fight for
democratization there is also the empathetic experience that assists. An empathetic
experience is when we share the emotions of people around us. This could mean the
proximity of either a geographical community or a virtual community. Psychology
studies show that when we are participating in digital media our brains are releasing
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Oxytocin.18 Oxytocin is the hormone related to caring and bonding within relationships.
These same studies also show that digital experiences can inspire the kind of bonding
experience through trust and empathy.19 It is this bonding that will engage users to share
and connect with each other and to assist in political struggles.
There have been many instances in which digital media has aided in the process
of democratization. In Spain, in 2004, demonstrations were organized via a text message
that led to the end of Prime Minister José María Aznar’s time in office, after he had
wrongly blamed the Madrid transit bombings on Basque separatists.20 In Moldova, in
2009, the Communist Party lost power after protests were coordinated via text messages,
Facebook messages, and Tweets.21 In Tunisia, in 2010 and 2011, the youth of the country
used Facebook and Twitter to share grievances, gain up-to-the-minute information, and
fuel a movement that led to the removal of Zine EI Abidine Ben Ali.22
So what qualities must a state possess to lead to a digital media revolution?
While each society creates their individual path, our network society is global and thus
there is interdependence in the process of “cultural transformation”.23 There are six
19
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requirements of democratic technologies: access, information, discussion, deliberation,
choice and action.24 I will go further into each of these requirements in my upcoming
chapters. These six requirements depend on the movers and the medium of a state.25
The movers are the people behind the protests as well as the regimes responding
to the protests. Protesters have the biggest effect when the public already constrains the
actions of the government.26 Literacy, unemployment, and nationalism also affect the
likelihood of whether protesters will be able to use digital media to change their regime.
These three criteria affect people’s ability to afford a computer, have access to the
Internet, and read what is being said online. Youth in the Arab world currently face high
unemployment and a high cost of living. But they are also relatively well educated which
leads to high literacy, confidence, and motivation to strive for change. Youth in China, on
the other hand, are at a declining rate since the 1980’s and have a great nationalism thus
they are less likely to democratize. There are high rates of youth in Zimbabwe that are
relatively uneducated compared to those in the Arab world. Also unemployment in
Zimbabwe is similar for all age ranges.27 A regime’s ability to succeed in stopping
protesters also depends on several qualities. Their ability to respond is very important, as
is their knowledge of sophisticated technology. China is very adept at technology with
filters, blocking content, long-term cyber warfare and pushing their own nationalistic
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message. The Zimbabwean government has begun monitoring certain key words
concerning Egypt and Libya on digital media websites, though, which does cause
concern.28
Along with the movers, the medium is also very important. Internet penetration
has grown significantly in the Arab world. Decades of state control over the media,
however, means repression of free speech is deeply felt. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, is
quite unsophisticated in terms of technology but their citizens’ Internet usage is also quite
low. Despite this, the Internet usage is increasing, mobile phone use is growing
exponentially, and the press is still relatively free.29
After the Iranian crackdown on the Internet in 2009, Freedom House, an
independent organization that supports and monitors freedom around the world,
published a report called Freedom on the Net. In this report, they state that the negative
trends towards Internet freedom is the expanding of censorship, the privatization of
censorship, a lack of transparency and accountability, legal threats, and technical attacks.
The positive trends are poverty not being a barrier to new media freedom, growing civic
activism, and Internet freedom being greater than press freedom.30 I plan on exploring
Internet freedom further as it is vital to any digital media revolutions.
Just as there are many people that argue digital media can help people work
towards democratization, there are many that argue digital media has hindered
democratization. One argument against technology assisting democratization is that the
28
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tools are ineffective. Malcolm Gladwell in New Yorker concentrates on ‘slacktivism’
where casual participants want change through activities such as joining a Facebook
group.31 As Morozovo states, “You can’t simply join a revolution any time you want,
contribute a comma to a random revolutionary decree, rephrase the guillotine manual and
then slack off for months. Revolutions prize centralization and require fully-committed
leaders, strict discipline, absolute dedication and strong relationships based on trust”.32
While this is true, there are indeed committed actors that use digital media effectively.
The effective use of digital media in revolutions has been shown in instances such as
Egypt where people use these technologies to organize and promote protests.
In order to determine the effects digital media has on democratization I use both
quantitative research, to compare democratic and non-democratic countries to countries
that allow or engage in digital media, and qualitative research, to review both current and
past events and analyze what caused the beginnings of the revolutions. I will also
examine other scholars’ quantitative and qualitative analyses.
I have reviewed relevant information from the following categories to argue my
position: The historical process of democratization, how the invention of digital media
has affected the rate of democratization, the censorship of digital media, the
demographics of nations, and the history of digital media. My research includes several
books on the democratization of countries and the connections between communication
and democratization. I also gathered academic journals and news articles that are being
published while Egypt is transforming. I have explored the literature from both a

31
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technical and analytical point of view made possible due to my background in
information technology.
I also used case studies to support my findings. I will start by observing the
occurrences of the EDSA revolution in the Philippines. There have been several attempts
at changing the regime in the Philippines since 1970 including the movement that forced
former President Ferdinand Marcos out of office in 1986. Unlike in 1986, wired and
wireless technologies made the 2001 revolution larger in scope and reach.
President Estrada was run out of office by angry citizens that were mobilized via
text messages on mobile devices. It was this wireless technology that became the
“effective messengers of information.”33 The technology allowed people to mobilize
quickly and efficiently, creating a snowball effect towards a common goal. While the
Filipinos were successful without the use of digital media in 1986, governments now
have a much wider range of tools at their disposal in order to maintain their position and
thus citizens need to broaden their reach as well in order to be successful.
The second case study I explored is that of the recent revolutions in Egypt. While
this situation is ongoing I feel that we can learn by observing the overall timeline of
events leading up to and during the revolution. The Egyptian revolution of 2011 began on
January 25th with the first demonstrations. Egyptian citizens, inspired by the successful
revolution in Tunisia, went to the streets of Cairo’s Tahrir Square to protest the 30-yearold regime that had created poverty, unemployment, and corruption. 34

33

ibid.
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After 18 days of protests, President Hosni Mubarak stepped down on February
11th, 2011. The young people of Egypt overturned a regime that lasted three decades in
order to start a new order in the Arab world. President Obama commended the Egyptians
on their victory stating, “Egyptians have made it clear that nothing less than genuine
democracy will carry the day.”35 The digital media website Facebook was quickly
credited with the success of the uprising. Google Marketing Manager Wael Ghonim
played a key role in organizing the January revolutions on Facebook. Before being
imprisoned in Cairo he reached out to Egyptian youths via Facebook to gather masses on
the streets.
In an interview with CNN, Ghonim argued that Facebook and the Internet were
responsible for the uprisings. He said, “I want to meet Mark Zuckerberg one day and
thank him [...] I'm talking on behalf of Egypt. [...] This revolution started online. This
revolution started on Facebook. This revolution started [...] in June 2010 when hundreds
of thousands of Egyptians started collaborating content. We would post a video on
Facebook that would be shared by 60,000 people on their walls within a few hours. I've
always said that if you want to liberate a society just give them the Internet. [...]”36
As with the ousting of President Estrada in 2001, the revolutions in Egypt were
not thought of because of digital media tools. They were brought together by poor
conditions in their countries. Filipinos were fighting injustice of the courts in order to get

35

David Kirpatrick, “Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down,” New York Times,
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Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/egypt-facebook-revolution-waelghonim_n_822078.html?view=screen.
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a President impeached. Egyptians, on the other hand, were protesting the entire
government and order in their nation. However, in both instances, the people of their
individual nations used a new technology to join together in order to show the reigning
regimes their desires and to bring about a new order in the countries. As one protester in
Cairo summed it up, “We use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate,
and YouTube to tell the world”.37
My thesis contains seven chapters. The first chapter delves into the history of
democratization around the world. The second chapter discusses and defines different
forms of digital media. It also reviews the history of communication methods including
digital media. The third chapter contains research on how digital media can assist
democratization and discusses the flexibility, low cost, scalability, survivability,
accessibility and speed of digital media. The fourth chapter looks at other scholars’
quantitative and qualitative analyses. It will review the positive and negative aspects of
both forms of studies. The fifth and sixth chapters looks at the use of text messages in
ousting President Estrada in the Philippines in 2001 and the use of Facebook in the
Egyptian revolutions in 2011. The seventh chapter reviews the antithesis of my
hypothesis by looking at how digital media can hinder the democratization of some
nations. I also explore governments that censor digital media or use digital media to
promote their own messages. Finally, the conclusion reviews the previous chapters’
arguments and will examine how we can measure success.

37
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Technological freedom is a very important initiative of the twenty-first century. It
is extremely important that we not only study but also protect digital media, as it is more
than just a way for college students to procrastinate between classes. Digital media, as a
key ingredient and catalyst of the fourth wave of democratization, has a huge impact on
our society as well as to globalization as a whole. As Marc MacKinnon wrote during the
Thai protests, “Twitter didn’t create the hatred, it amplified it.”38 When we examine the
necessary elements a non-democratic nation needs in order to be a likely candidate for a
digital media revolution we can better predict the future.
Within the past decade people around the world have become progressively more
aware and interested in the new uses of digital technologies in movements for political
change. Digital activism is the use of digital technologies such as mobile phones,
computers, and Internet-enabled devices to campaign for political or social change. We
study these practices in order to better understand and possibly replicate the effective
tactics in similar situations.
The goal of my thesis is to examine the link between information and
communication technologies and democratization in order to answer some difficult
questions: What the value of information and communication technologies is in the
process of democratization around the world? Where has digital activism successfully
transformed or liberalized a government in a democratic direction? How did those that
have succeeded use these new technologies as opposed to the several others that have
failed? Are the successful practices replicable in other scenarios with similar contexts? In

38

Mark MacKinnon, “Twitter’s role in Bangkok conflict unprecedented - The Globe and Mail,”
The Globe and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/twitters-role-in-bangkokconflict-unprecedented/article1578064.
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studying, analyzing, and evaluating digital activism I hope to determine how citizens can
use digital technologies more efficiently in order to exercise their political power more
effectively.
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Defining and Understanding Democratization
Democratization is the process of a regime becoming more democratic.
Democracy is a type of government where people are holding the power, either
themselves or by electing representatives. There is currently, and might not ever be, a
universally accepted definition of democracy. Despite this, most scholars and politicians
agree that equality and freedom are two of the most important characteristics of a
democratic regime. Many also agree that democracy includes free and equal social,
economic, and political conditions. Democratization does not always conclude in
consolidation though. It could encounter frequent reversals as in Argentina.
Democratization is influenced by many factors. The most recurrent mentioned aspects are
economic development, education, resources, and civil society.
The word democracy actually comes from the Greek term dēmokratía which
means rule of the people. This term was introduced during the middle of the 5th-4th
century BC in order to explain political systems in city-states such as Athens. While the
term democracy was coined in Ancient Greece, democratic practices were prevalent in
early societies such as Mesopotamia, Phoenicia and India.39
Unfortunately, as James Hyland argued in Democracy Theory, while most people
claim to be in favor of democracy, people cannot agree on what democracy means.40
Rather than try to give democracy a definition, Robert Dahl examines what conditions
“favor or impede” democratization in his book Polyarchy: Participation and
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B. Isakhan, and S. Stockwell (co-eds). The Secret History of Democracy, (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011), p. 19–59.
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James L. Hyland, Democratic theory: the philosophical foundations, (Manchester: Manchester
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Opposition.41
Dahl lists the necessities for Democracy within a large group of people. He
believes there needs to be a liberty to form and join organizations, freedom of expression,
a right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for
support, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for
making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.42 Dahl
argues that a country absolutely needs to have a tolerant government in order to be a
democracy. Even if the nation had universal suffrage, if they had a repressive
government, there would not be opportunities for opposition within the country.43 Dahl
does an excellent job of pointing out what qualities a democratic regime must have as
well as what conditions
Larry Jay Diamond and Leonardo Morlino also discuss what conditions are
necessary for both newly democratized and long standing democratic nations in their
book Assessing the Quality of Democracy. However, before we can rate a democracy,
Diamond and Morlino believe we first need to know what a democracy is. They claim
democracy has four requirements: 1) universal, adult suffrage; 2) recurring, free,
competitive, and fair elections; 3) more than one serious political party; and 4) alternative
sources of information.44
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Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy: participation and opposition, (New Haven: Yale University
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Diamond and Morlino continue to argue that a true democracy will have a quality
of results, content and procedures. Through this they mean that the citizens will be
satisfied with their expectations of their government, the government will allow citizens
political equality and the freedom to judge the performance of the government through
elections in order to hold government officials and institutions accountable.45
Democratic freedom consists of political, civil and social rights. Diamond and
Morlino believe governments are not democratic unless they permit all adult citizens the
right to participate. More so, good democracies make sure citizens are able to use these
rights in voting, organizing and protesting for their interests.46 Democracies also need
competition between different political parties. The country should have regular, free, and
fair elections for the different parties to compete.47 The elected political leaders must be
held accountable vertically to their voters in their decisions as well as horizontally to
other officials and state institutions.48
While governments possess several of Diamond and Morlino’s dimensions of
democratic qualities they still may not please most citizens. Diamond and Morlino
contend this because citizens don’t always know what will happen after their desired
policy is enacted. Since information reaches citizens faster than ever before media
sensationalism has taken over to the point where negative aspects are highlighted most
often in mass media. Finally, citizens may not be completely happy because a democracy
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is fundamentally multifaceted.49 Diamond and Morlino conclude that democracies need
reforms in order to consolidate and work against public discontent and disappointment.50
Samuel Huntington, the author of The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century, argued “a wave of democratization is a group of transitions from
nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and
that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of
time.” He deemed that a wave could even involve liberalization or partial
democratization in nations that were not able to fully consolidate. 51
According to Huntington, three waves of modern democratization emerged.
However, a wave of democratization does not mean all nations involved were fully
consolidated. The first two waves were followed by reverse waves where some of the
nations involved transitioned back to a nondemocratic regime.52
The first wave of democratization occurred from 1828 through 1926 in American
and French revolutions. According to Jonathan Sunshine, there are two minimal
democratic criteria for when nineteenth century regimes would begin to democratize.
First, fifty percent of male adults would have to be eligible to vote. Second, a responsible
leader is elected and supported by the majority of people. Huntington argues that by
using Sunshine’s standards of measurement it can be inferred that the United States
began the first wave of democratization in 1828.53
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A reverse wave followed from 1922 through 1942. Following the reverse wave, a
second wave of democratization began in 1943 and ended in 1962. This wave began
during World War II with allied occupations promoting democracy in West Germany,
Austria, Italy, Korea, and Japan. Many nations democratized during the second wave.
Turkey, Greece, Brazil and Costa Rica began the democratization process in the late
1940s and early 1950s while Uruguay returned to democracy during the war. Huntington
reveals that Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela all had elections in 1945 and 1946.
The democratic practices in these countries did not last though and they were all replaced
by dictatorships by the early 1950s. Argentina and Peru did move back towards unstable
limited democracies later in the decade. In the same decade, the other two Latin
countries, Colombia and Venezuela, ended their military dictatorships through
negotiations and introduced lasting democratic regimes.54
The second reverse wave occurred from 1958 through 1975. Huntington asserted
that the third wave of democratization began in 1974 and went through the 1990s. The
third wave commenced with the end of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974 and affected
about thirty authoritarian regimes in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Many other
countries faced liberalization, legitimacy, and democratic strength as well. Portugal
created a parliamentary and ratified a new constitution for elections with popular
approval.55
Later in the decade the military leaders in Ecuador withdrew from politics. The
country formed a new constitution and held elections, which produced a civilian
government. A similar experience happened in Peru, which led to a constituent assembly,
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then the election of a civilian president in 1980. Unlike Peru and Ecuador, the military
withdrawal in Bolivia created four years of coups until the election of a civilian president
in 1982. Two years later Uruguay elected a civilian president after negotiations between
the military and political leaders. During the mid 1980s Guatemala also elected a
constituent assembly and civilian president.56
Asia was also affected by the third wave of democratization. In the late 1970s
India returned to democracy. In the early 1980s Turkey produced a civilian government
after their military departed. Benigno Aquino was assassinated the same year, which led
to the end of the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines and the return of democracy.
Taiwan also became dedicated to democracy in the 1980s.57
Huntington’s main point regarding these waves was that democratization at these
points in time was a global movement. Despite the reverse waves, in which Huntington
believed was “a two-step-forward, one-step-backward pattern,” democratization did
progress either with full out democratic consolidation or simply liberalization.58
Unlike the previous authors, Jack Goldstone concentrates on social revolutions in
the process of democratization rather than defining democracy. Goldstone is an American
political scientist, sociologist, and the author of Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative,
and Historical Studies. In this book, Goldstone questions why some governments have
been taken down by their own citizens while others have not.
Many people believe it is as simple as “misery breeds revolt.” Goldstone explains
this means when people believe their oppression is too much to handle the masses will
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revolt against their oppressor. Goldstone offers a second explanation: when the state
faces many struggles at the same time such as bankruptcy, conflicts between those in
power, war, and/or famine revolutions may begin. A third explanation is that radical ideas
change people’s everyday lives. When people see these extreme ideals they may feel it
would allow them to lead a better life and thus are more likely to revolt in order to obtain
these principles.59
Yet the concept of democracy was even discussed amongst Greeks and Romans.
So why did this idea of democratization only become the cause of revolutions over two
thousand years later? Goldstone mentions the comparative study of revolutions began
after the Russian Revolution of 1917 through 1921. Since then there have been three
generations of studies: the natural histories from 1920 through the 1930s, the general
theories of the 1960s through early 70s, and the structural theories from the 1970s
through 80s. The fourth generation, as Goldstone attests, began with the collapse of the
Soviet Union.60
In order to study revolutions, Goldstone looks at the English Revolution of 1640,
the American Revolution of 1776, the French Revolution of 1789, and the Russian
Revolution of 1917. By looking at these historical revolutions Goldstone develops ten
major events to describe the revolutionary process.61
First, before the revolution many times the intellectuals stop supporting those in
power and demand change. Prior to the French Revolution Voltaire and Beaumarchais
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wrote plays for the aristocrats and Russian nobles demanded local parliaments before the
Russian Revolution.62
Second, before the old regime falls the state typically tries to make reforms in
order to stop criticism from being spread. Their belief is that they can accommodate the
opposition groups without giving them any real power. These types of reforms typically
lead to further opposition against the regime. This occurred in France with the reform of
Louis XVI, the Stolypin reform in Russia, and the Boxer reforms in China.
Third, the regime’s inability to deal with a political, economic or military crisis
starts the fall of the regime.63
Fourth, after the revolution has brought down the old regime internal troubles
start to erupt and cause additional problems. The euphoria of success wears off after time
when the opposition tries to start forming a new regime.64
Fifth, moderate reformers are typically the first to gain control of the state. This
can be seen in Iran when Bazargan, a moderate critic, took power after the Shah was
forced out twenty years ago.65
Sixth, more radical reformers will begin to mobilize against the moderate reforms.
In France the moderate Girondin assembly faced the radical Jacobin clubs and in
America, the radical Sons of Liberty pushed the moderate critics of King George III into
revolutionary war.66
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Seventh, the important changes generally occur after the radicals have taken over
the moderates. Goldstone argued that the changes do not occur when the old regime falls
because the moderates taking over typically do not get rid of the problems that caused the
old regime to fail in the first place. As a result they find themselves with the same
economic, political, and military issues.67
Eighth, the radicals typically use a coercive ruling style and force an imposition of
order upon the society to cease the disorder. An example of this is the guillotine days
during the French Revolution as well as Stalin’s gulag and Mao’s cultural revolutions.68
Ninth, Goldstone believes the struggle between the moderates, radicals, and those
in favor of the old regime permit the military leaders to become leaders. Goldstone’s
example for this includes Washington, Cromwell, Napoleon, Mao, and Ataturk.69
The tenth and final revolutionary phase is when progress starts being made and a
new status quo is formed. The moderates will finally have defeated the radicals. This
happened with the fall of Robespierre in France, Khrushchev’s repudiation of Stalin in
Russia, and the fall of Mao’s allies, the gang of four in China.70
Goldstone does an excellent job of reviewing previous revolutions in order to find
commonalities. However, even Goldstone’s ten revolutionary phases failed to answer
why revolutions arise in the first place. He also failed to take into account that nations
have distinctive features and respond differently to events. What happens during one, or
even four revolutions, does not necessarily mean it will happen for future revolutions
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especially given the globalization we face today.
Goldstone continues to mention the general theory approach to revolution. Within
the general theories Goldstone discusses Davies psychological approach that “misery
breeds revolt” and Gurr’s refined approach of identifying the different kinds of misery
that leads to political chaos. Davies and Gurr argue that people will accept great
oppression if they expect it to occur in life. It is when these people begin to anticipate a
better life that they will become frustrated and resent their oppressors. Thus they argue
that it is change in society that will give people the desire for a better life without their
government providing the means to attaining their wishes. This begins to destabilize the
regime. 71
Smelser and Johnson developed another general theory. They argued that
academics should focus more on social institutions than on the dissatisfaction felt by the
society. They claim that governments will stay stable as long as the society’s economic,
political, and the available upward movement of youth grows at the same pace.72
Samuel Huntington, who I have already discussed, combined Davies, Gurr,
Smelser, and Johnson’s approaches. Huntington believed that it was the modernization of
societies that lead to an imbalance of the regime. As the educational and economic
subsystems grow, so do people’s desire to have a role in their political system. This
becomes a problem when the political institution does not grow as fast as the other
subsystems in order to accommodate people’s desire for change. This in turn creates
frustrated expectations, which lead to thoughts and sometimes actions of revolutions.73
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Goldstone points to Tilly’s argument that dissatisfaction alone doesn’t result in
revolutions as long as the dissatisfied stay unorganized and without means of organizing.
Tilly holds that conflict and disgruntlement is normal in politics but that violence will
occur when the oppressed have the necessary resources to take action. Thus, according to
Tilly, while modernization will bring higher expectations and thus discontent, it will not
necessarily lead to a revolution until the oppressed have the means to mobilize the masses
and the resources to challenge the regime. 74
Each of these general theories had issues with explaining why the revolutions
occurred in the first place. When academics realized that societies will not experience the
same process of modernization or democratization was too easy, they began to step away
from the general theories towards structural theories of revolution.75
Those who argue in favor of structural theories believe that regimes will differ in
their structure and thus are susceptible to diverse forms of revolutions. Structural
theorists maintain that revolutions initiate with a combination of a weak regime, foreign
conflicts, issues with the elites of the society, and mass uprisings. Unlike general
theorists, structural theorists reason that states are organizations made up of resources in
their society and that some will not hold up as well as others in crises. States become
open to a revolution or coup when the elites of a nation are in opposition with the state.
However, it is only when there is widespread opposition throughout the nation that a full
revolution may occur.76
While general and structural theorists provide a good amount of information
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about revolutions they fail to explain why revolutions occur in some countries and not
others. Goldstone believes the first step towards explaining why revolutions occur is
scrutinizing the revolutionary process.77 This process will uncover why a revolution has
specific characteristics.
There are many ways for a state to respond to the beginning stages of a
revolution. They could react with change or additional oppression. The way the state
responds as well as the societies opinion of the state’s reaction greatly determines
whether or not the societies growing revolution is suppressed. As Goldstone mentions, a
major paradox of a revolution is that even with a state’s attempts to avoid a revolution
through reform or repression it typically makes things worse. When the state offers
change more demands arise. When the state further represses its citizens they become
more enraged and are more likely to act out.78 Typically the end of an old regime does
not end a revolution. It is merely the beginning of the effort to shape the revolutions
outcome. It could take years for the revolutionary leaders to build a new and lasting
institution.79
When there is an imbalance between the demands of a society and the
government along with the government’s ability to respond, the state’s stability declines.
When the state’s stability declines the risk of revolutions is increased.80
Furthermore, Huntingdon argues that democratic regimes are more impervious
against revolutions than authoritarian ones. He quotes Che Guevara, a major figure of the
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Cuban Revolution, as saying, revolutions can’t succeed against a government which “has
come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at
least an appearance of constitutional legality.” However, from the early nineteenth
century down to 1990 democracies did not, with only trivial or formal exceptions, fight
other democracies.” Therefore Huntington concludes as long as democracy continues to
spread, eventually we will live in peace.81
A report Freedom House put out in 2005 concerning the nonviolent civic
resistance in democratization contributes to Huntington’s position. In this study they
found that nonviolent civic resistance was a strong factor in 67 countries that had
collapsed dictatorships since 1972. They stated that in these processes, "changes were
catalyzed not through foreign invasion, and only rarely through armed revolt or voluntary
elite-driven reforms, but overwhelmingly by democratic civil society organizations
utilizing nonviolent action and other forms of civil resistance, such as strikes, boycotts,
civil disobedience, and mass protests."82
The way foreign powers react to revolutions is also very important. The foreign
nation has the option to either support, oppose, or ignore the revolution. Goldstone
stresses that when a world is more supportive it increases the chance of open revolutions.
He argues that this explains how when the U.S. in 1979 and the U.S.S.R. in 1989 were
not enforcing the status quo a wave of revolutions dependant on foreign support occurred
throughout Nicaragua, Iran, the Philippines, Afghanistan and Eastern Europe causing
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these nations to depend on their own feeble resources.83
Thus, according to Goldstone, three aspects shape a revolution. First it is shaped
by the state, elites, and popular grievances. Second it is shaped by ideologies, coalitions,
and conflicts that arise during the revolution. Finally, it is shaped by the disagreements
between different leaders.84
All of these authors have contributed towards defining democracy and what
causes a nation to democratize. However, the majority of them assume that the
democratization process for one nation will be quite similar to the democratization
process of another despite the historical or geographic location of the nation. This is not
the case. Hyland does succeed in explaining that there is not a single meaning of
democracy nor is there a single path to democratization.85 Because of this we need to
think of the process towards democratization and the countries involved as more or less
democratic. This is important to remember in my following chapters as democratization
is not an ending result, but rather a process all democratic regimes must participate in.
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Defining and Understanding New Technologies
Social media is not the first technology associated with freedom. Previous
inventions such as the printing press, telegraph, radio, telephone and computer all led
towards the invention of social technologies. The radio began as a messaging service
before it was used as a broadcast system. The telephone was created for business use only
and people were even told not to chat ‘frivolously.’86 The Internet also was originally
used as a business and research tool rather than for public usage. All of these inventions
have the ability to free individuals, as well as to assist their oppressors.87
But social media did not start with social networking sites such as Facebook.
Social media existed well before the Internet was even created. In the 1950s people began
phone ‘phreaking’ by exploring telephone networks. These people, ‘phone phreaks,’
studied and explored the equipment and systems of the public telephone network in order
to satisfy their desire for information. They built homemade devices that would produce
the necessary tones to allow them to make free calls as well as gain access to the back
end of the telephone network. Phone phreaking became especially popular in 1971 when
Ron Rosenbaum wrote an article for Esquire Magazine called “Secrets of the Little Blue
Box.”88
Even the first blogs and podcasts can be said to have taken place over voice mail
systems rather than on the Internet. Phone phreaks would hack into corporate voice mail
systems called codelines and leave messages that other people could comment on. The
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phreak would then respond to these comments in his or her next update. They would
continue this until they were caught and would then move on to the next mailbox. This
continued through the 1990’s until products such as mobile phones and Skype were
readily available.89
Social media did take a giant step forward with the invention of the Internet.
While static merely a decade ago, the Internet is now both interactive and personalized to
allow users to share experiences online.90 Barry Wellman argues that social networks are
“profoundly transforming the nature of communities, sociality, and interpersonal
relations”.91 Although cultures may have opposing cultural values, these networks enable
them to share their values of communication and thus interact more easily.92
The Internet, as the FNC passed in a resolution on October 24, 1995, refers to the
“global information system that (i) is logically linked together by a globally unique
address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons;
(ii) is able to support communications using the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons, and/or other IPcompatible protocols; and (iii) provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or
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privately, high level services layered on the communications and related infrastructure
described herein.”93
The first concept of the Internet can be found in the memos, “Galactic Network”,
written by J.C.R. Licklider in August 1962 at MIT.94 His idea concerned a set of
computers that would be connected globally where anyone could access data.
Before Licklider’s vision could become a reality there were several steps that
needed to be overcome. One key step was when Leonard Kleinrock published a paper on
packet switching theory at MIT in July 1961.95 Packet switching would allow for a faster
response time as well as a better utilization of bandwidth. It would divide the messages
into packets with the routing decisions made based on each individual packet. With this
paper the early research and development of the Internet had begun.
A second key step towards computer networking was to find a way for computers
to be able to talk. Lawrence Roberts and Thomas Merrill were able to overcome this
challenge when they connected the TX-2 computer in Massachusetts at MIT to the Q-32
computer in Santa Monica, California in 1965 using a low speed dial-up circuit switched
telephone line and acoustic couplers. While the telephone line worked fine for data, it
was not sufficient bandwidth and it was expensive.96 This incompetent connection
confirmed Kleinrock’s belief of the need for packet switching.97 Work on packet
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switching networks was occurring simultaneously at the National Physical Laboratory
and MIT.98 Packet switching was used to break up data into small pieces and then send
these pieces individually over a network. This would increase efficiency.99 Merely a year
later Roberts left MIT to plan for ARPANET, the predecessor of the Internet.
Governmental agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), the Bureau of Standards, and the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA) in the Development of Defense funded the majority of work done in the
beginning towards the creation of the Internet.100 Work on ARPANET began in 1969 by
ARPA to enable computers to share resources among researches across the country.
Kleinrock’s Network Measurement Center at UCLA was chosen to be the first
connection on ARPANET. In September 1969 the Bolt Beranek and Newman (BBN)
group at UCLA installed the first Interface Message Processor (IMP) as the first host
computer connection. The team working on the first site, the Network Working Group,
worked on developing a protocol.

101

The second connection was located at the Stanford

Research Institute. The final two connections were created in the end of 1969 at UC
Santa Barbara and the University of Utah.102 These four connections were the initial
creation of ARPANET. Within the next few years other computers were quickly added to
ARPANET.
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On October 29, 1969 the first host-to-host connection was made.103 As Kleinrock
said in an interview, “We set up a telephone connection between us and the guys at SRI.
We typed the L and we asked on the phone, ‘Do you see the L?’ ‘Yes, we see the L,’
came the response. We typed the O, and we asked ‘Do you see the O.’ ‘Yes, we see the
O.’ Then we typed the G, and the system crashed...”104
Ray Tomlison at BBN created the first electronic mail application in March 1972
in order to send and read software over ARPANET. He developed the user@host
convention. What was interesting was that Tomlison chose the @ sign arbitrarily even
though the character was used by several other systems various commands. These
“header wars” were not settled until the 1980’s when the @ sign became the global
standard.105 Roberts furthers the creation of this application by adding the ability to file,
forward, selectively read, and respond to messages.106
Since ARPANET was connecting several incompatible computers for various
purposes, a set of standard protocols was needed. An open-architecture network was
essential for unifying different network interfaces, providers, and locations. Robert Kahn
created the idea of an open-architecture network in 1972. Since the Host-to-Host
protocol, the Network Control Protocol, could not address other networks, Kahn, along
with Vint Cerf from Stanford, began to develop a new version of the protocol, the
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) to work with an open-
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architecture network.107 The Specification of Internet Transmission Control Program, the
document that described the functions of the TCP/IP, contained the first use of the term
Internet. This term was used as shorthand for the adjective internetworking.108 At the
same time Xerox PARC was working on a wire-based system for Local Area Networks
(LANs), which would become known as Ethernet.109
Several changes were needed with the growth of the Internet. With the increase of
computers and connections it was important to assign names to hosts so that people
would not need to remember a numeric address. When independently managed networks
grew it was no longer possible to have a single list of hosts. Because of this Paul
Mockapetris and Jon Postel of USC/ISI and Craig Partridge of BBN created the Domain
Name System (DNS) and the user@host.domain address system in 1983.110 Another
necessary change was creating a hierarchical model of routers with an Interior and
Exterior Gateway Protocol tying different regions together.111
Tom Truscott and Jim Ellis, Duke University students, created Usenet, an Internet
discussion system. This system allowed the distribution of online forums for those using
a UNIX operating system. Users could submit messages to the Usenet group and have it
be available to all other users of the group in order to have a discussion.112 These Usenet
systems were a precursor to social media that allowed people to post articles to different
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newsgroups. These Usenet systems contained many of the same features that Google and
Yahoo! Groups use today. They are also responsible for the creation of newsreaders and
RSS feeds.113
In the late 70’s Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) started appearing online. Originally
opened to the public by Ward Christensen, these systems were typically hosted on a
personal computer and only one user could access them at a time through the host
computer’s telephone modem. These sites are credited as being the first form of website
that allowed people to interact. People would have social discussions, play online games,
or contribute to the files available for download. It is also important to note that the
majority of content found on BBSs were illegal such as viruses, directions for hacking,
The Anarchist’s Cookbook, and other adult material.114
The early 80’s brought about commercial online systems. CompuServe, America
Online, and Prodigy were developed in order to allow personal computers to access data.
They were not originally created to offer Internet access. Users would have to dial up
using a modem and software to the provider’s computer center in order to shop online,
email other users, and enter chat rooms.115
When ARPANET was created it was a single network. In the decade from 1973
through 1983 it became a system with multiple networks. Many branches of the United
States government got involved in the research and development of the Internet, the
successor of ARPANET including the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA),
the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Department of Energy (DOE). In fact
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there were several different networks being created. MFNET was created by the U.S.
Department of Energy for researchers of Magnetic Fusion Energy, High Energy
Physicists created HEPNet, SPAN was created for NASA physicists, and CSNET was
created for academics of the computer science community. These networks were created
with a specific community in mind, academics. By 1985, ARPANET was able to connect
several communities of researchers.116 Thus began the merging of networks and the
creation of the Internet.
In 1985 the U.S. National Science Foundation Net declared their desire to serve
all of the higher education community rather than just a specific concentration. The NSF
suggested that its networks look to commercial customers in order to expand their
facilities and lower subscription costs.
By 1985 there were 2,000 hosts on the Internet with the networks growing to
nearly 30,000 by 1987. Two years later, Tim Barners-Lee brought up the issue of the
rotating people and organizations assigned to projects. He proposed a hypertext system to
work on different operating systems and run across the Internet.117 The term Internet
began to be used as the name of the network while NSFNET was linked with ARPANET
in the late 1980s. Thanks to NSFNET, ARPANET was formally shut down in 1990 after
becoming obsolete. It had 300,000 hosts by the end of its long run.118 A year after
ARPANET was shut down, NSF created a plan to have the Internet taken over by a
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commercial service provider. It wasn’t until 1995, though, that U.S. government
ownership of the Internet finally ended.119
In 1988 Internet Relay Chat (IRC) was created. It was the first instant messaging
client and was used to share files, links, and communicate with others. It was UNIXbased and because of this the general population did not have access.120
An important change to the Internet took place when Time Berners-Lee created
World Wide Web in 1990 at CERN. CERN is a European physics lab near Geneva,
Switzerland. It is said that Berners-Lee was disappointed with the lack of graphics on the
Internet given its text-only format. He also wanted to be able to link sites from around the
world. It became publicly available on August 6th, 1991. Berners-Lee kept the World
Wide Web as freeware, and by 1992 servers were set up at other physics research centers
in the United States to support it. A year later Marc Andressen at NCSA developed a web
browser called Mosaic to add color to Web pages. In 1994 Andressen began work on a
new commercial browser, Netscape, while Microsoft worked on Internet Explorer.
David Bohnett and John Rezner founded one of the first social networking sites,
Geocites, in 1994. The idea behind Geocites was that each user would create their own
website that would be categorized by one of six neighborhoods. The neighborhoods
included Colosseum, Hollywood, RodeoDrive, SunsetStrip, WallStreet, and West
Hollywood. In January 1990 Yahoo! purchased Geocites for $3.57 billion in stock.121
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In 1997 AOL Instant Messenger (AIM) was made available to the general public,
making instant messaging incredibly popular. It had been available to AOL employees
since 1995 and to AOL subscribers since early 1996. AIM was the first real time instant
messenger service. The early uses of AIM included peer-to-peer instant messaging, chat
rooms, and file sharing. Later versions brought games to be played between users, away
messages, cell phone integration, and Facebook support.122
Later that year Andrew Weinreich launched SixDegrees.com as a social
networking site. Six Degrees was the first modern social networking website. This site
allowed users to create profiles, list their friends that were users on the site as well as
friends offline, and send messages to each other.123 A profile is a person’s unique page
where they can enter information such as their age, location, interests, contact
information, and possible a photo of themselves. Also the term friends may not be an
interpersonal relationship formed offline; it could be a random person the user has never
and will never meet in person. SixDegrees.com shares the same social-circles network
model as many of the popular social networking sites we use today. At the height of its
popularity, it had close to a million members.124 This site was purchased in 2000 for 125
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million, and closed in 2001.125 The founder of SixDegrees believed that the site was
simply ahead of its time, and perhaps he was correct. 126
The next social media site to take off was Friendster in 2002. It had a user base of
over 90 million registered users at its peak with the majority coming from Asia. The goal
of Friendster was to create a safe place for people to meet new people including their
friends-of-friends in order to expand their social circles.127 Unfortunately the servers used
by Friendster were not able to sustain Friendster’s growth and thus the site went down
quite often. While Friendster’s popularity was increasing in the Philippines, Singapore,
and Indonesia, many of the users in the U.S. became frustrated with the site’s technical
difficulties and began using their email to connect with friends rather than Friendster.128
In 2003 the popular LinkedIn was founded as a professional social network. Users
could upload their resume or post a profile and then interact with other users. LinkedIn
operates on the idea that you should actually know the people you are interacting with on
the site. Over time groups, forums, and job boards were created.129 While most social
networks up until this point focused on communicating with friends on the Internet or
meeting new people to date, this site focused on expanding one’s professional network in
the same way people would pass out business cards or introduce acquaintances for
specific business ventures.
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MySpace launched in 2003 and was the most popular social network site in the
world by 2006. It first began growing its user base by utilizing the estrangement felt by
many of Friendster’s users. MySpace was able to distinguish itself by allowing people to
customize their profiles by allowing users to edit and add html code. People can also add
music or videos to their profiles and post public comments on their friends’ profile. Users
can also send private messages or group messages.130 MySpace also grew its popularity
by allowing bands to create their own pages in order for fans and bands to interact. Bands
could inform their fans of upcoming shows and users could access their bands’ pages in
order to listen to new music. News Corporation purchased MySpace in July 2005 for
$580 million before any of the many safety issues, including sexual interactions between
adults and minors began to estrange users from the site.131 While many users have fled
MySpace, the site is still in operation and considered one of the top social networking
sites. In fact, as of July 2011, Justin Timberlake, former member of the boy band ‘N Sync
and current actor, teamed up with Specific Media to purchase the social networking site
for $35 million, 94% less than News Corp had paid for it in 2005, to attempt to
resuscitate it.132
Launched in 2004 for college students, Facebook had more than 600 million users
as of January 2011.133 It was originally created to connect students at Harvard College
but quickly grew to other colleges as well before admitting high schools, businesses, and
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then opening to the general public. Facebook exists and thrives because people desire to
share information with others. Facebook grew to be the leading social networking site in
2008 when it started having more unique visitors per month than MySpace. The main
difference between Facebook and MySpace is that Facebook does not allow for the same
customization as MySpace.
Twitter is a more recent social networking website created in 2006 operating with
the intent of being a microblog for users to send and read messages. These messages,
called Tweets, are text-based messages up to 140 characters. Twitter has many celebrity
followers including Ashton Kutcher, Oprah, Martha Stewart, MC Hammer, and Demi
Moore.134 The goal of Twitter is to connect people all over the globe. In order to do this
freedom of expression is essential. As Twitter blogged, “Some Tweets may facilitate
positive change in a repressed country, some make us laugh, some make us think, some
downright anger a vast majority of users”.135
Several media sharing social networking sites have also popped up in recent
years. In 2003 Photobucket launched as the first major site to allow users to share their
photographs online either to their friends and family or to the public. Flickr, owned by
Yahoo!, is also a photo sharing site. As of June 2009, Flickr claims to have more than 3.6
million images stored on their site. YouTube launched in 2005 as the first major video
hosting site. On YouTube people can upload videos up to 10 minutes in length. They can
then share their videos on the site or embed them on other websites.136
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Similar to media sharing sites, there is also a selection of sites that are dedicated
to sharing news. One social news site, Delicious (Del.icio.us) allows people to bookmark
sites and articles they find interesting and then share them with other people. Digg users,
on the other hand, share links to anything online. Other users then vote on posted content
to determine its popularity by either voting for it (“dig”) or voting against it (“bury”).
This site was created in 2004 before even YouTube launched.137
There are several other social media websites including the U.S.-made Wikipedia,
the Chinese instant messaging service QQ, WikiLeaks whose servers are located in
Sweden, the Spanish social network Tuenti, the Korean social network Naver, and
Speak2Tweet, which is a voicemail transcription service for Twitter created by Google
and Twitter during the Egyptian revolutions. Google’s Orkut was unsuccessful in the
U.S. but is insanely popular in Brazil. Mobile applications, networks, and devices have
also been included in social media.
Mobile phones have also had a huge effect on social media and the
democratization process through social media. In the beginning mobile phones had to
stay within a specific area. There was no such thing as a continuity of service. It was not
until 1970 when Amos Joel, Jr., a Bell Labs engineer, invented a system to allow these
mobile phones to move between cell areas without interrupting conversations.138 At the
same time two-way mobile radios were being developed to be used in taxicabs, police
vehicles, and ambulances. These mobile radios were not connected to the telephone
network though. In Sweden, in 1960, the first mobile phone system, the Mobile
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Telephone System A, was created to make and receive calls using a rotary dial in one’s
car.139
The first portable mobile phone was created by Martin Cooper, a Motorola
researcher, in April 1973, despite the long race between Motorola and Bell Labs. This
first generation (1G) of mobile phones had the ability to transfer calls from one site to
another as a person moved between cells. The first commercial cellular network was
launched in Japan in 1979 by NTT and covered Tokyo’s 20 million citizens with 23 base
stations.140
The second generation (2G) mobile phone system was developed in the 1990’s
using the first GSM network, Radiolinja, in Finland. This phone system used digital
rather than analog transmission.141
The first mobile phone that was able to connect to the Internet, the Nokia 9000
Communicator, was created in 1996 in Finland. This mobile phone was introduced at
$1900 to appear like a regular mobile phone with a small keyboard similar to a handheld
computer. It had a 24MHz Intel 80386EX embedded processor and used the Geos
operating system. It allowed users to connect their phone to a computer in order to
download or upload data, and included an alarm clock, a browser, and a section for
facsimile and electronic mail.142
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The third generation (3G) technology changed from using circuit switching for
data transmission to using packet switching for data transmission. Once again, NTT
DoCoMo launched the first trial network with third generation technology in Tokyo,
Japan in May 2001. While mobile phones had the ability to access the Internet for several
years by this point, it was not until 3G technology that smartphones with Internet access
capability regularly appeared thanks to their ability to connect over Wi-Fi rather than to a
computer via a USB plug.143
The iPhone, an internet-enabled smartphone created by Apple, was introduced 11
years after the Internet was first brought to mobile phones with the Nokia 9000. The
iPhone has a global following and has been credited with the rise in popularity of realtime updates for sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Foursquare. Real time updates are
especially important in crises and revolutions when it is necessary to spread information
to large masses in little time.
Fourth generation (4G) technologies started being developed once it was clear
that 3G networks would not be able to handle bandwidth-intensive applications. 4G
networks eliminated the use of circuit switching and began using an IP network. WiMAX
standard, created by Sprint in the U.S., and the LTE standard, created by Scandinavian
company TeliaSonera, were the first two companies that offered 4G technologies
commercially.144
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For the purpose of my thesis, social media will include crowdsourcing, social
networking, online communities, blogging, micro-blogging, mobile technologies such as
short message services, flashmobs, sousveillance and Internet censorship circumvention.
Crowdsourcing can be defined as outsourcing different tasks such as gathering
information to the public via the Internet and/or mobile technology in order to obtain
collaborative content to which anyone can contribute. Supporters of a digital activism
campaign may all contribute a variety of content and/or skills to their campaign in order
to make it more dynamic despite limited finances and/or time.
Social networks are interconnected users that can engage with friends and other
users to share and discuss interests, events, activities, ideas, and/or media. An online
community is a form of social network sustained by membership rituals such as engaging
in chat-rooms or forums. When a piece of content is spread quickly online to friends,
acquaintances, social networks, and finally the world it is considered to have ‘gone viral.’
It is similar to how viruses are transmitted from person to person offline. Having gone
viral increases a piece of content’s visibility and thus the awareness of it.
A blog is an online webpage or website where an individual, group of people, or
an organization creates regular entries consisting of commentary with description of
events, graphics, videos, or other forms of media that visitors can then comment on. A
blog can be written by an individual, group of individuals or an organization in a
conversational manner. Blog posts may contain links, audio, video, images, etc. Most
blogs are written from the blogger’s viewpoint and may allow readers to post comments
and interact with the blogger/s. A micro-blog, on the other hand, is a form of online diary
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that limits users to short messages viewable by subscribers. The most popular
microblogging service today is Twitter.
A flashmob is a large group of people who gather abruptly and unexpectedly in a
public space to engage n a collective action before separating at the same speed. Within
digital activism, flash mobs can be coordinated through social media, text messages, or
email.
The term sousveillance describes the observation and recording of an activity of a
participant. Steven Mann, a professor at the University of Toronto, created the term to
describe when an event or activity is recorded from the viewpoint of an observer. With
the increase in smart mobile devises, there are more opportunities for citizens to monitor
their government, law enforcement, and corporations. It is now harder for those in power
to conceal their activities since anyone with a mobile phone can monitor and report their
findings to the world.
Mobile technology is a communication technology enabled by mobile phones to
make voice calls, use the short or multimedia messaging service (SMS or MMS), and
recently access the Internet. Short message service (SMS), also known as texting or text
messaging, allows for short messages to be sent from one mobile device to another. Many
mobile devices also use SIM cards. A SIM card is a piece of plastic found in mobile
phones that contains the subscriber identity module (SIM) that is a unique identifier. It
may hold the user’s phone number, email account, and text messages so that a user can
switch between different mobile devices.
Internet censorship circumvention is possible through various technologies that
allow users to evade barriers that block access to specific online content. These tools can
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be used alone or in concurrence with each other. They are used to share alternative
opinions, spread news-worthy and time-sensitive information, allow for collaborating,
access specific groups in a society that may be barred by traditional media, and mobilize
individuals with similar interests.145
Social media today has attracted users around the world so significantly that many
have incorporated these technologies into their daily routines. Whereas people once sat
down with a morning paper they may now read the New York Times on the iPhone
before ‘checking-in’ at the office on Foursquare and then making plans with friends via
Facebook. While these tools are certainly entertaining, and at times a drain on actual
productivity, they are also increasingly being used to help democratization efforts around
the world. I will further explore the use of social networks including mobile devices and
social media websites, in the upcoming chapters. What we can already say for certain;
however, is that social networks are important and are embedded in many societies. Some
social networks even have more users than the populations of small countries.
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Infrastructure and Contextual Conditions that Lead to Democratization
As Daniel Drezner, the author of Weighing the Scales: The Internet’s Effect on
State-Society Relations notes, “parsing out how ICTs affect the tug-of-war between states
and civil society activists is exceedingly difficult.”146 Democratization can’t be
researched sufficiently without looking at the role of digital information and
communication technologies. Thus, academics, journalists, and politicians all note that
there are several advantages to social media that assist and enhance the democratization
process. Proponents of this argument believe digital activism has the potential to
empower citizens to affect their political regimes. Scholars such as Yochai Benkler, Mark
Pesce, Clay Shirky, and Graeme Kirkpatrick advance this optimistic stance. 147
Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine, researchers from the University of Minnesota,
wrote the book People, Power and Change in 1970. This book discusses the
decentralized structure of social movements. According to Gerlach and Hine, social
movements include three characteristics:. The first characteristic is that they are
segmented. Social movements include several smaller nodes that contribute to the
movement. Social movements can also be polycentric. This refers to the characteristic of
social movements where there can be multiple leaders to influence the movement.
Finally, the social movements can be integrated. There can be multiple groups connected
through activists’ relationships or through a common set of beliefs.148 Networked
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societies are able to take advantage of these features as well in order to expand their
reach.
It is important to note that there is not just one formula for democratization.
Rather there are many different combinations of factors that create the same outcome.
There are many digital technology infrastructure conditions of digital media that assist
individuals in their campaigns for social change. The most important technology
condition to assist those desiring change might be access.149 While access does not
necessarily mean citizens will use the technology, without it they do not even have the
chance. Access to ICTs among a diverse and spread out population brings the nation
together over a common cause.
Examples of the different digital technology infrastructure conditions include the
speed and low cost of their tools. The swiftness combined with the reasonably priced
rates allows activists to organize around concrete goals.150 Many of the social media
websites used, such as Facebook and Twitter, are free. Other tools may have fees
associated with them while still offering free versions with limited features. These sites
are all accessible any time of the day and are able to send messages, photos, videos, etc.
at the drop of a hat. Sending a message to someone across the world can be done in an
instant. Users of Twitter are even able to receive Twitter feeds via their mobile devices.
These devices also allow for live tweeting so the updates are instantaneous. People can
post the latest news concerning protests as well as their impressions from the street.
Setting up one’s website is also relatively inexpensive as compared to the costs

149

Henry Jenkins, Democracy and New Media, p. 27.

150

Jeffrey Juris, "The New Digital Media and Activist Networking within Anti-Corporate
Globalization Movements.”

50

associated with renting physical space to hold off-line meetings.
Mobile devices are also relatively inexpensive compared to their wired
counterparts. Short Message Service (SMS) or text messages are very economical.
Although SMS messaging was first introduced as a free promotional gimmick in 1995, it
has remained relatively inexpensive.151 Text messaging is usually one-tenth of the price
of wired telephone service making this a significant economic difference for people
living in countries where people live on less than a dollar a day. These messages can be
used in a myriad of ways, including recruiting supporters, sharing information, and
assisting in the mobilization of people. Many activists have also used SMS in order to
gain funds or sign petitions by sending a short code and their name to a specific number.
In her article, Activism Transforms Digital: The Social Movement Perspective,
Anastasia Kavada discusses five key practices for activists wishing to distribute
information quickly and inexpensively. First they can set up a website for their campaign.
They could also create a website for a specific event. Activists use alternative media
platforms such as Indymedia. They can use blogging, micro-blogging, video and photosharing platforms such as Twitter, Blogger, YouTube, and Flickr. Finally, they can make
information, photos, and/or videos go viral through email or networking sites such as
MySpace and Facebook. It is the low cost of each of these options that allow the social
movements to bypass mainstream media.152
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Another feature of digital media that assists the democratization process is the
ability for communities to form in patterns other than within towns or even national
borders. These tools allow for fast and cheap communication that is not restrained by
typical national borders. Since the Internet is borderless, it helps activists organize and
coordinate protests in different nations. It also helps activists plan physical meetings.
Social media has become inherent in many western societies and a crucial form of
communication. These communities offer users empowerment and nourish the ideals of
citizenship. These tech savvy activists generally think of themselves as belonging to a
global movement. Their local activities become directly linked to problems around the
world.
The change of hierarchy in regard to power is another benefit of digital media
tools. Benkler, Pesce, and Shirky argue digital networks allow people to communicate
outside of the typical power structure.153 Instead of a top down hierarchy, as is with most
efforts, social media allows for a more flexible coordination among people with minimal
structure. Digital networks consist of a more peer-to-peer chain of command. This creates
the ability to send information without managerial control or formal organizations.154
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Digital technologies and networks also have the capability of changing power
relationships offline.
These mediums also allow for a constant flow of information in societies where
the media is generally censored to permit only pro-government messages and gives a
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voice to those that have been silenced. It allows people to share and gain information that
is sometimes not available or is censored to give them a false idea of what is happening
in their country.
Along with giving people a voice in a censored society, digital media has the
capability for activists to access and discover information. Activists have increased
access to the news, reports, and other publications. They also have more opportunities to
view suppressed information through sites such as Wikileaks. The Internet also gives
activists access to different tools and platforms, such as Google Alerts, Digg, Del.icio.us,
to monitor and share information.
When the Internet was originally created it was intended to be a place that
exemplifies freedom of expression and communication for people around the world. This
concept was best expressed by John Perry Barlowin, an Internet theorist, in 1996 in the
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace.
“Governments of the Industrial World... I declare the global social space we are
building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us.
You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of
enforcement we have true reason to fear. Governments derive their just powers
from the consent of the governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours.
We did not invite you. . . . Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. . . . We
are creating a world where anyone anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no
matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity.”156
The idea of ‘Sousveillance’ is another tactic used by activists. Steven Mann, a
professor at the University of Toronto, created the term to describe when an event or
activity is recorded from the viewpoint of an observer. With the increase in smart mobile
devices, there are more opportunities for citizens to monitor their government, law
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enforcement, and corporations. It is now harder for those in power to conceal their
activities since anyone with a mobile phone can monitor and report their findings to the
world.
One example of this occurred on New Year’s Day in Oakland, California. Several
mobile phone users were able to capture a video of a police officer shooting Oscar Grant
who was unarmed and restrained by other officers. These videos were uploaded to
YouTube where they spread virally. After viewing these videos, several people began
organizing rallies. While Grant did in fact die of his injuries, these videos helped in the
prosecution of the officers.157
Another tactic for digital activism is election monitoring and observation. Mobile
phones have been used to combat fraudulent elections and voting fraud.
MobileActive.org, a global network of people using mobile phones to make a social and
political impact, was created in part by Katrin Verclas. Verclas believes mobile phones
can be used for informal citizen-based election monitoring and data generation as well as
more methodical organization where trained activists can monitor elections. These two
methods have been used in countries such as Lebanon, Mexico, Ghana, Kenya, Sierra
Leone, and India. As Kofi Annan, a former United Nations Secretary General mentioned
to CNN on August 25, 2008, “With communication and cell phones, this is where it is
difficult to cheat in elections now. You are announced at the district level and cell phones
go wild so by the time you go to the capital, if you have changed the figures, they will
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know and you will be caught out.”158 Annan praised the use of these mobile phones in
maintaining free and fair elections.
The capturing and sharing of videos and photographs is also now possible on
mobile phones. Several mobile phones even allow users to upload videos directly from
their phones to YouTube. These videos can then be shared with friends, other activists, or
even international media outlets in order to reach millions of people. Iranian citizens used
this technology during the June 2009 protests in Tehran following the presidential
elections. Iranians suspected the election was fraudulent and demanded a recount. Many
people outside of Iran learned about these protests from the violent images and videos
captured on mobile phones and broadcasts worldwide. Since Al Jazeera and BBC World
maintained that the Iranian government was censoring their broadcasts, the use of mobile
phones was one of the few ways to transmit information.159
Many mobile devices today have location-aware applications and networks. Due
to the GPS sensors, mobile phones are able to pinpoint a physical location. These
applications have had great success with crisis reporting, election monitoring, and citizen
journalism. Specifically, in Kenya in 2008 and in Gaza in 2009, citizens were able to
report the location of incidents during these turmoil situations using their phones’ GPS
and SMS.160 Some applications that use location-aware technology are FourSquare,
Brightkite, Loopt, and Google Latitude.
In addition to the different technologies available to activists there are also
specific tactics used for activism. One such tactic is “smart mobbing.” Howard
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Rheingold, the author of Smart Mobs, created this term. According to Rheingold, a smart
mob is a group of people to coordinate their actions through the use of mobile devices
such as phones, PDAs (Personal Digital Assistant) and SMS.161 While these smart mobs
typically were without any centralized control, there were often activist groups directing
their configuration. Thus, despite the lack of a formal leader, protesters have the ability to
function as a group by relying on SMS for information on when and where to go as well
as what to do.
Despite the lack of organizers, individual activists can use new digital
applications and tools to coordinate protests in new ways that were not possible in the
past. Digital media tools also have the capability for coordinating and decision-making.
They offer people ways to easily become members by subscribing to an email list or
joining a Facebook group. It allows activists a place for discussion to organize actions or
determine the next step. It aids the scheduling of meetings and events through calendarmatching services. Activists can vote via the Internet or even exchange to-do lists.
Citizens of Kiev protested for over two weeks concerning the results of the
presidential election during the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. These protesters
believed the election to be fraudulent. Pora, a pro-democracy group, used text messages
to coordinate demonstrations, send information to participants, and to increase the
effectiveness of the protest. They used these text messages to schedule shifts to move
people between ten cities to prolong the demonstrations. These protests resulted in a new
election, which elected the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko.162
Coordination was especially beneficial when American student James Karl Buck
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and his translator were arrested during protests in Egypt in April 2008. Buck was able to
send a text message to update his Twitter feed with a single word: “Arrested.” Buck’s
Twitter followers worked together and were able to obtain his release within hours.163
Manuel Castells, a leading sociologist of information society and communications
research, argues three features that make networks the most efficient.164 Social media
emit these three features: First, their flexibility allows reconfiguration based on a
changing environment while retaining original goals.165 The Internet epitomizes the
concept of a flexible and decentralized method of communication. It is because of this
released form of organization that makes the Internet beneficial to social movements.
People can start their movement using one tool and easily switch to a different tool if
there is fear of their government learning their location and enforcing repercussions.
Castells’ second feature, scalability, is the ability to expand or minimize without
disruption.166 An example of scalability is the ability of mobile devices for bulk text
messaging. This is a relatively new creation. Mobile phone users are not able to send bulk
text messages. This makes it much easier to send information to a group of people
instantly. This is also possible using many new social media sites such as YouTube. With
larger audiences there is the possibility of messages to go viral. When this happens,
authorities have a harder time stopping the spread of these messages.
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Castells’ third feature of digital media tools that assist democratization is their
survivability. Survivability is the network’s ability to withstand attacks.167 Survivability
is extremely important given authoritarian regimes’ ability to halt protesters by censoring
news stories, shutting down access to specific sites, or shutting off Internet access as a
whole.
Mobile phones are also beneficial for activism because they can maintain
communication with participants and outsiders even if/when mainstream media is cut off.
In 2007 the Burmese government banned the majority of foreign media outlets and forbid
reporting against its policies. Many civilians continued protests using their mobile phones
to share news, upload photos and videos, and contact the press.168 Similarly, in 2007 and
2008, Pakistani citizens used their mobile phones to contact radio stations when their
country was under emergency rule. The government had censored and shut down
independent media outlets but the radio stations were able to rebroadcast citizens’
messages.169
Kavada discusses how digital technology assists social movements through new
tools. Kavada explains while the Internet greatly facilitates the mobilization of people in
movements, the movements can also fail as fast as they begin. These movements
typically last when people continually work together towards a common goal even if that
goal changes. Kavada believes it is the stability and continuity that make online
movements last.170

167
168
169
170

ibid.
Brannon Cullum, “Devices: The Power of Mobile Phones,” p. 51.
ibid.
Anastasia Kavada, “Activism Transforms Digital: The Social Movement Perspective,” p. 113.

58

Within these characteristics Kavada argues open narratives, regular offline
meetings, well-defined objectives, and a permanent online space helps create a lasting
online movement.171 It is important for online movements to have an open narrative in
terms of their goals. This helps the movement maintain a continual stream of new
members. It also helps them change their short-term goals as needed to make the most of
new information.
Having regular offline meetings are also extremely important. With the increasing
number of websites devoted to social movements it makes it nearly impossible for
activists to actively participate in every one of them. Because of this the movement may
become dispersed and have less of an effect. With offline meetings and demonstrations,
activists are brought together at the same place and time.172 This helps the movement feel
a greater sense of belonging.
Having well-defined projects is especially important to movements. By focusing
on a specific objective, activists are forced to develop a good relationship and put any
differences behind them for the benefit of the movement.173 The relationship developed
through the movement will also remain once the project is finished creating a tighter
network that would be more likely to remain over time.
The last characteristic important to making online movements last, a permanent
online space, reinforces the stability and continuity of the movement. Activists located in
different countries need to be able to easily find new information. A permanent space
helps keep the movement grounded for both existing and new participants. They will also
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be a place of recording and archiving past actions, decisions, and discussions.174
There are also many contextual conditions that can lead to democratization with
the assistance of ICTs. One such factor is the availability of information and education
within the country. Without the relevant education and information of how to use these
new ICTs, citizens cannot effectively use them to mobilize. Education also leads to the
knowledge of other political possibilities to strive for. Within this factor there is also the
possibility of the new technologies stimulating political and social discussions amongst
citizens and possibly between citizens and leaders.
Another factor is the average incomes within the country. The equitable
distribution of wealth across the population is also very important. These disparities in
wealth are frequently abused by authoritarian regimes. This scenario can be exaggerated
by elections. These disparities are a huge motivation for social unrest. While poverty is a
huge factor in peoples’ motivation to rise up against their government, a perception,
whether real or not, of economic disparities is a main factor in the likelihood of civil
unrest. When those at the lower end of the economic ladder feel the space between them
and the elite growing to insurmountable measures they are more motivated. Because of
this, countries where the majority of people are financially stable are more likely to
experience stable social climates with a lower possibility of violence and/or radical
democratization movements. 175
The average level of income within the nation is another factor that can lead to
social unrest. Countries with well-educated citizens typically have a better understanding
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of the cause of their poverty along with the repercussions of their financial status.
Because of this they have a greater understanding of the political, social and financial
alternatives and are more likely to work harder to attain their ideal status.176
The importance of fuel exports for the nation’s economy is also an important
cause of social rebellion. The majority of oil-rich states are quite wealthy yet they also
suffer from having nearly half of their citizens living on less than two dollars per day.
Seven of the ten wealthiest heads of state in the world come from underprivileged Arab
countries.177
The combination of the infrastructure and contextual conditions has the possibility
of creating a space where individuals feel they have both the resources and reasons for
rising up against their regime.178 When successful, these individuals create a new system
for communication between politicians, journalists, civic groups, elites, and average
citizens. This new political outcome can then lead to institutional consequences where
democratization may lead to either democratic transition or possibly even democratic
entrenchment.
Howard discusses the sufficient and necessary causes of both democratic
transition and democratic entrenchment. He also discusses the percentage of cases
covered by the specific solution and the consistency of the cases noting the necessary and
sufficient causes of one with the highest degree of coverage and another with the highest
degree of consistency.179
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Howard begins with the causes leading to democratic transition. Having an active
online society in a country with a small population is one sufficient cause of democratic
transition. This cause covers 65 percent of Howard’s case studies and was consistent
across 82 percent of cases. Having an active online society in a country with a welleducated population is a sufficient cause that covers 63 percent of cases with a 74 percent
consistency. Having a small population is a necessary cause found in 76 percent of his
cases leading to democratic transition with an 85 percent consistency rating. Having an
active online society in a small and well-educated country is a necessary cause covered
by 68 percent of cases with consistency across 91 percent of covered cases leading to
democratic transitions.180
The two most outstanding sufficient causes of democratic transition include an
active online society. This factor along with having a small or well-educated population
appears to represent close to two-thirds of Howard’s cases. Having a small population is
the main solitary cause with the best-case coverage. Yet having all three causes account
for 68 percent of the cases with a 91 percent consistency rating.181 However, having a
large civil society alone is not sufficient without education. The Internet and mobile
phone base of a society is what leads to multiple formulas for democratization.
Howard then discusses the sufficient and necessary causes that lead to democratic
entrenchment. Having a well-developed ICT infrastructure with an economy that is not
dependent on fuel exports is a sufficient cause in 56 percent of cases leading to
democratic entrenchment with an 86 percent consistency rating. Having a well-educated
population along with an economy not dependent on fuel exports is covered by 51
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percent of Howard’s case studies leading to democratic entrenchment with an 86 percent
consistency rating. Having an economy not dominated by fuel exports is a necessary
cause in 77 percent of cases leading to democratic entrenchment with 73 percent
consistency. Having a well-developed ICT infrastructure, an economy not dependent on
fuel-exports and a well-educated population is a necessary condition in 77 percent of
cases leading to democratic entrenchment and is consistent 96 percent of the time.182
As for democratic entrenchment, Howard’s study found that a well-developed
ICT infrastructure along with not being dependent on fuel exports is a sufficient cause.
Having a well-educated population and not being dependent on fuel exports is the second
best set of sufficient causes of democratic entrenchment. As Howard notes, having an
economy that is not dependent on fuel exports is a main ingredient in both cases of
democratic entrenchment.183
There have been many instances where the features of these tools have aided in
the process of democratization. In Moldova, in 2009, the Communist Party lost power
after protests were coordinated via a text message, Facebook messages, and Tweets.184 In
Egypt, in 2011, it took a mere 18 days for citizens to take down a 30-year police state
government with the help of Facebook.185 As one protester in Cairo summed it up, “We
use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the
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world.”186 In Tunisia, in 2010-2011, the youth of the country used Facebook and Twitter
to share grievances, gain up-to-the-minute information, and fuel a movement that led to a
revolution and the removal of Zine EI Abidine Ben Ali.187
Another example of citizens using mobile phones in order to create political
change occurred during the 2004 general election in Spain. Merely days before the
Spanish national parliamentary election three trains were bombed in Madrid. These
bombings resulted in the deaths of 192 people and the injuring of hundreds others.
Immediately after the bombings the governing Popular Party (PP) stated that the Basque
terrorist group ETA was responsible for the bombing. They announced this before there
was any evidence concerning the violent act. By the end of the day Al Qaeda had claimed
responsibility for the bombing despite the Spanish government’s continual assertion that
the ETA was to blame. Many believe the government took this stance because it would
benefit the Popular Party in the upcoming election against the Social Party. Spanish
citizens were outraged by the government’s response and their attempt to cover up
legitimate evidence that connected Al Qaeda to the bombings.188
Many of these outraged citizens called for protests to express their anger towards
the government. The mobile penetration rate of Spain in 2004 was at 94 percent. This
shows that most Spaniards had the ability to send and receive text messages on their
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mobile phones. The first SMS message was sent on March 13, the day before the
election, and stated, “The government lied. Pass it on.” Some other messages that were
sent stated, “18:00 PP head office Genova St. no parties silence for the truth,”
“Information poisoning at 18:00 PP Genova pass it on,” “We want to know before we
vote,” and “The truth now, stop the manipulation, your war, our dead. Pass it on!” 189
Despite Spain’s ban on any political protests occurring within a day of any
election, ten thousand citizens ignored the ban and gathered in front of the PP
headquarters in Madrid by 11:00 pm. There was a 20 percent increase in text messages on
March 13th and a 40 percent increase on March 14th, the day of the election. These text
messages urged Spaniards to vote for the Socialist Party and join in the protests. These
digital activism tactics proved successful when the Socialist Party defeated the PP with a
turnout of 77 percent of the population, which was an increase of 8 percent from the
previous year.190
In his book, Guerra, Terrorismo y elecciones: incidencia electoral de los
atentados islamistas en Madrid, Narciso Michavilla argued the greater the voters were
influenced by the bombings the more they hesitated before voting. Thus the longer they
waited the more likely they were to vote for the Socialists as illustrated in Figure 1.
Michavila concluded that “the association between the final election and the influence of
the attacks is statistically significant.”191
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Figure 1

Final vote for PP, PSOE, or others, among late-deciding voters in the Spanish
parliamentary elections of March 14, 2004, according to the influence of the
events of March 11 on voters’ decisions
Source: N. Michavilla, p. 29.

Because of all of these characteristics of digital media tools users have the ability
to form masses of 100,000 people in cities such as Ismailia with a population of 750,000
million.192 Without these sites groups might not be able to organize mobs of people large
enough to have an affect on their government. While larger groups do not always equal
success, they do make a larger impact, as illustrated by smart mobs.
Graeme Kirkpatrick argues in his book Technology and Social Power, that people
construct their own value and meaning of technology based upon how they use it. Thus
by using a site such as YouTube to send political content we transform the web into a
political platform.193 Digital media tools have the ability to turn dissatisfaction into
collective action. The tools aid the organization, spread of information, mobilization,
coordination, and organization of social movements. The future of digital activism is very
optimistic. With mobile phones becoming more affordable and more developing nations
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switching to 3G mobile networks, along with more communities adopting Internet access
through Internet cafes and hot-spots, activists have the ability to access new applications
and tools in order to employ the many beneficial features in digital media technologies.
These technologies along with specific contextual conditions create an atmosphere more
prone to democratization and possibly even democratic entrenchment.
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Evidence of the Link Between Social Media and Democratization
The purpose of this chapter is to review the different quantitative and qualitative
evidence on the ties between digital media and democratization. There are several
different approaches to studying these ties and I will review them in order to demonstrate
the current evidence available to support my thesis. The goal of reviewing the following
studies is for better understanding of how liberation technologies can change the balance
of power between authoritarian regimes and the opposition movements that protest them.
The first section of this chapter will offer studies involved in a quantitative analysis. The
second section provides a review of qualitative studies, in particular, concerning R. Kelly
Garrett’s article Protest in an information society: A review of literature on social
movements and new ICTs.
Quantitative Analyses
Christopher Kedzie is one of the first researchers to conduct quantitative approach
concerning the relationship between the Internet and democracy. He uses data from 144
countries along with linear regression to analyze “the strength of traditional predictors of
democracy including economic development and education, human development and
health, ethnicity and culture, as well as indicators that represent pre-Internet ICTs, and
studies them against the strength of Internet prevalence.”194 Kedzie concludes that the
Internet is a better predictor of democracy than other traditional predictors. This study
was based on information from 1993.195 At this time there were still very few Internet
users, even less in developing countries, and many social media sites and location-aware
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technology was not yet prevalent in society.
Figure 2

source:Christopher R. Kedzie

Best and Wade also conducted a study concerning the effects Internet has on
democracy around the world. They used data from 180 countries from 1992 through 2002
and statistical methods to examine the relationships between different predictors related
to democracy and Internet prevalence based on region. While their results from 1992
through 2000 was limited due to ignoring the impact of mobile phones and being presocial media sites their data from 2001-2002 did show a “substantial relationship between
Internet usage and democracy” even when “accounting for region and socioeconomic
development.”196 The study’s finding “supports the existence of a positive relationship
between democratic growth and Internet penetration.” 197
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Figure 3

source: Philip N. Howard

Philip Howard completed research on how information infrastructures support
democratization in Muslim countries. He created a weighted index of technology
diffusion and democracy for 74 countries from 1994 through 2008. “The index of
technology diffusion was computed … for mobile phones, Internet users, Internet hosts,
personal computers, national Internet bandwidth, and broadband Internet users, and then
averaged and transformed into set-theoretic values.”198 The technology variables were
weighted against the GDP of the country in order to keep wealth constant before
calculating the diffusion index. His results show the level of technology diffusion in a
country with its economic output compared to the other 73 countries. He then used fuzzyset statistical models to put the countries into three groups based on their individual levels
of information technology and democratization. Finally he used correlation statistics to
conclude that six percent of the variation in democratization in Muslim countries can be

198

ibid.

70

explained by technology diffusion. 199
Figure 4

Degrees of Membership in the Set of Countries where
Technology Diffusion caused Democratization
source: Philip N. Howard

Howard’s results “demonstrate that an active online civil society and good state
information infrastructure in small countries with well educated populations has resulted
in democratic transitions. The two most prominent and parsimonious sufficient causes of
democratic transition share one ingredient—having a comparatively active online civil
society. Having such an active online civil society, along with having a comparatively
small population or a comparatively well-educated population, proves to represent almost
two-thirds of the cases studied.”200 The results also show that “it is the relatively large
internet and mobile phone user base—a wired civil society—that consistently serves as a
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causal condition across multiple democratization recipes.”201 He concludes “among the
countries with large Muslim communities, those with a rapidly expanding information
infrastructure experienced either democratic transitions or entrenchment. This conclusion
makes an explicit link through which technology diffusion can contribute to
democratization.”202
Howard continues, “For countries such as Bosnia, Georgia, and Indonesia, good
ICT infrastructure supported strong democratic movements. For Azerbaijan and the
Central African Republic, the lack of technology diffusion has allowed for deepening
authoritarianism. For countries such as Benin, Eritrea, and Gambia, technology diffusion
has not been particularly rapid, and democratization movements in these countries have
had little success.”203 Yet even with his analysis, Howard argues that statistical analysis is
not enough to determine how information technology infrastructure supports
democratization. Instead he promotes for a study to be done using qualitative,
comparative, and quantitative research. As Howard states, “perhaps the best reason to
proceed in a qualitative and comparative way is that the categories of ‘democracy’ and
‘technology diffusion’ are themselves aggregates and proxies for other measurable
phenomena.”
Manuel Castells, along with Mireia Fernandez-Ardevol, Jack Linchuan Qiu, and
Araba Sey, conducted a study concerning the use of mobile devices in social movements.
They begin their study by mentioning the typical argument that technology is more often
adopted by those with higher socio-economic statuses. They agree that this assumption
201
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can be made by looking at the Asian Pacific and the United States, however, as Castells,
et al. discovered; when one looks at Europe they will notice that income is not an
important predictor of cell phone adoption. The average cell phone penetration rate in
Europe was at 70 percent as of 2004 and even up to 90 percent in some countries.
Because of this the authors of The Mobile Communication Society believe that the higher
the technology penetration rate, the less income differences matter.204
This, however, is not relevant in countries where the technological penetration
rate is significantly lower than that of European countries. In these countries socioeconomic status still remains a significant factor in whether or not a person will own or
operate a mobile phone. For example, in South Korea 84.3 percent of people with a
monthly income above KRW 3.5 million had adopted the mobile phone technology
whereas only 69.9 percent of those who earn less than KRW 2 million per month had
adopted it.205
While socio-economic status does indeed make a huge difference in the adoption
of mobile phones in countries that have lower penetration rates, there are still other
methods for the lower income classes to obtain this technology. One of the more popular
options is using a prepaid service. Between 70 and 90 percent of mobile subscribers in
the Philippines use prepaid phone cards instead of having fixed-term contracts with a
mobile phone provider.206 These prepaid phone cards are an excellent choice for those
without credit history, a stable source of income, or a permanent address.
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People’s income also affects the rate of adoption of mobile phones and mobile
Internet. In 2004 the majority of mobile phone users in China had a medium income and
education with 45 percent having a monthly income of 800-3,000 Yuan and 10.6 percent
having a high-income bracket of more than 3,000 Yuan. Thus over 55 percent of monthly
subscribers had a medium to high monthly income. This shows that those with a higher
income tend to adopt new technology earlier than their counterparts.207
The United Nation’s International Telecommunications Union estimated there
were 4.1 billion people worldwide in 2009 that subscribed to mobile phone with twothirds of those people located in developing countries.208 Also the 2009 report on digital
activism reported by DigiActive noted that those with a mobile phone with more features
were more likely to use their phones for activism.209
There are several limitations to most quantitative analysis studies concerning the
use of the Internet and/or digital media. The data available for these studies typically end
before the mobile phone was as prevalent as it is not and before most major social media
websites were even created. The quantitative study performed by Howard is the only one
that uses data through 2008. The studies also typically focus on either the Internet or the
use of mobile phones but rarely touch on both. It is important to study both since they
work together especially when using social media on ones’ internet-enabled mobile
device. Also the research typically groups data on either democratic or authoritarian
states but forget that the democratization of authoritarian states may not always lead
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quickly to consolidation but may pause at liberalization. This is not to say liberalization is
not a significant mark of progress.
Qualitative Analyses
The second part of this chapter reviews qualitative analyses done by researchers
in the field. I will review R. Kelly Garrett’s study along with James Hyland, Philip
Howard, Clay Shirky, and several others. These scholars use case studies in order to
provide conclusions concerning the ties between digital media and democratization.
In Protest in an information society: A Review of Literature on Social Movements
and New ICTs, R. Kelly Garrett “explains the emergence, development and outcomes of
social movements by addressing three interrelated factors: mobilizing structures,
opportunity structures and framing processes.”210 Garrett starts with three mechanisms
concerning the use of information and communication technology to assist with
democratization: mobilizing structures, opportunity structures, and framing processes.
According to Garrett, mobilizing structures aid the organization and collective action.
They may include social structures and/or tactical Opportunity Structures are the
conditions that support a social movement. Finally, framing processes are “strategic
attempts to craft, disseminate, and contest the language and narratives used to describe a
movement.”211
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Figure 5

According to Garrett, “Organizing a review of the relationship between social
movements and new ICTs along these lines facilitates conversations across the field
around common issues of concern, highlighting connections between scholars and
research agendas that might otherwise be difficult to discern. The breadth of the
framework, integrating several major strands of social movement scholarship, makes it
particularly appropriate to the task. A recent volume addressing the relationship between
social movements and new ICTs effectively employs a similar strategy for integrating the
studies it includes.”212
Howard then breaks these three factors down into subgroups. Mobilizing
structures are broken down into categories such as participation levels, contentious
activity, recruitment and organizational issues. These subgroups are then broken down
even further. Participation levels are broken down to reduction of participation costs,
promotion of collective identity, and creation of community. These categories are not
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mutually exclusive nor are they necessarily interdependent.
Under mobilizing structures, Garrett discusses the influence of ICT on
participation in social movements. He believes it is linked to the reduction of
participation costs, the promotion of the collective identity, and the creation of a
community. Participation is very important for civic engagement. “The effect of Internet
use on engagement is positive.” 213
Information and communication technologies certainly have the potential to
“reduce the costs of conventional forms of participation, and to create new low-cost
forms of participation, ultimately contributing to an upsurge in participation.”214 Garrett
argues that by lowering these costs the ICT’s can help with group formation, recruitment,
retention, and efficiency in order to increase political participation.
Similarly, Howard argues that, “countries where Internet access has become less
costly have seen greater use and a greater number of civic groups taking to the Internet.
Some groups are long-standing contributors to civic discourse; many are new and exist
because the Internet has facilitated the interaction and organization of likeminded
citizens.”215 As an example, Howard explains how new ICTs in Iran “gave social
movement leaders the capacity not only to reach out to sympathetic audiences overseas
but also to reach two important domestic constituencies: rural, conservative voters who
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had few connections to the urban chaos; and the clerical establishment.”216
James Hyland purports that in a smaller and more local society in which people
are face-to-face information travels effortlessly. However, many societies do not exist of
simply a small town where people see each other every day and can inform one another
of town events. In large countries where people in cities and far reached rural areas never
even meet there needs to be a method to distribute the information to the masses. Thus
Hyland argues, “the freedom of the press’, not to mention its quality and who controls it,
is and must be one of the fundamental elements of a mass democracy.”217
In addition, Shirky claims, “as the communications landscape gets denser, more
complex, and more participatory, the networked population is gaining greater access to
information, more opportunities to engage in public speech, and an enhanced ability to
undertake collective action.”218
Finally,

Garrett concludes that international social movements cannot

communicate as efficiently without today’s ICTs since “costs and delays associated with
prior communication technologies made coordinating transnational advocacy too
cumbersome to be effective.” 219
Next under participation, ICTs promote the collective identity. They may further
the view “among individuals that they are members of a larger community by virtue of
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the grievances they share.”220 ICTs may also promote the collective identity across
borders. This allows activists to more easily mobilize.
Also under participation, ICTs can assist with the creation of a sense of
community “through automated mailing lists that distribute announcements, online
discussion forums such as chat rooms, message boards, text/instant messaging, and links
to the web ring of affinity groups with like-minded objectives.”221 As Howard describes,
“Opposition campaign managers in Iran consistently say that such Internet applications
allow them to get messages out as never before and thereby organize bigger and bigger
campaign rallies. Without access to broadcast media, savvy opposition campaigners
turned social media applications like Facebook from minor pop culture fads into a major
tool of political communication.” 222
Besides the technological advantages to using social media in the fight for
democratization there is also the empathetic experience that assists. This could mean the
proximity of either a geographical community or a virtual community. An empathetic
experience is when we share the emotion of what is occurring to the people around us.
This greatly helps in forming a sense of community. Studies show that when we are
participating in social media our brains are releasing Oxytocin. Oxytocin is the hormone
related to caring and bonding within relationships. These same studies also show that
digital experiences can inspire the kind of bonding experience through trust and
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empathy.223 It is this bonding that will engage users to share and connect with each other
and to assist in political struggles.
The next factor that influences mobilization structures by linking ICTs with social
movements is contentious activity. One aspect of ICTs is their “ability to accelerate and
geographically extend the diffusion of social movement information and of protest.”224
ICTs allow information to travel at a faster pace and to far reach places. They also allow
activists to use new forms of contentious activity.
One type of contentious activity that is made possible by ICTs is the alteration of
existing tactics to influence the media and create transparency. These new technologies
employ concepts such as sousveillance and deterrence. In 2009, President Obama argued
that “the more freely information flows, the stronger the society becomes, because then
citizens of countries around the world can hold their own government accountable.”225 As
Garrett mentions, “Elites are more likely to behave in a manner consistent with citizen
concerns if they work in an environment where they must assume their actions are being
observed and that news of any inappropriate actions—even those traditionally outside the
media spotlight—will quickly reach the public.” 226
The final factor to contribute to mobilizing structures is organizational issues.
ICTs “facilitate the adoption of decentralized, non-hierarchical organizational forms, and
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make movement-entrepreneur-led activism more likely.”227 Bruce Etling, Robert Faris
and John Palfrey, in Political Change in the Digital Age: The Fragility and Promise of
Online Organizing, discuss how smart mobs are an increasingly effective method of
digital activism given their ability to take governments by surprise. “In a few cases, the
ability of a mob to quickly overwhelm unprepared governments has been successful.”228
Because of these items there will likely be a rise in ICT facilitated protests.
Bringing down President Estrada via a text message was a great example of the
early eruption of smart mobs but it was not the only one. Thousands of bicyclists gather
monthly for “Critical Mass” demonstrations since 1992 riding through San Francisco
after having been alerted by mobile phones and mass email chains. Demonstrators
protested the meeting of the World Trade Organization on November 30, 1999 using
“swarming” tactics, mobile phones, and websites to win the “Battle of Seattle.” The
following Spring, a group of violent demonstrators were videoed using a webcast to
chronicle these protests. In September of that year thousands of British citizens used
mobile phones, SMS, email and CB radios to coordinate groups to block fuel delivery at
specific gas stations to protest the sudden rise in gas prices.229
The second factor to connect ICT’s and democratization through social
movements are opportunity structures. Opportunity structures include both political and
economic contexts. Within the political context there is the accessibility to the political
system, which reduces resistance, the alignment among elites, and the state’s allies.
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Within the economic context there is the idea that ICTs “foster transnational
activity, including contention, and this ultimately influences national-level political
opportunity structures.”230 In this context we find the dictator’s dilemma. The idea behind
the dictator’s dilemma is that “globalization and globalized markets—largely facilitated
and accelerated by the Internet—force governments to keep their countries’
communication borders open.”231
The third factor in Garrett’s framework is the framing processes. The framing
processes include “strategic attempts to craft, disseminate and contest the language and
narratives used to describe a movement.”232 As Howard mentions, “it used to be that
these cultural elites were able to define public opinion. Now there are mechanisms for at
least allowing some contrasts and divergence of opinion. The Internet and mobile phones,
in some modest respects, have freed public opinion from being narrowly constituted as
the opinion of a small elite.”233
ICTs allow people to bypass state media. New technologies have reduced the
necessary resources to get around state ventures. Because of this “information available
online is less likely than other mass media formats to conform to the prevailing nationallevel ideological and hegemonic structures, because the potential for nearly anyone to
participate and contribute in an online environment is much greater than it has been with
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other, more traditional media.”234 ICTs can also be a useful tool for covering news and
producing exposure.
In particular, wireless communications are increasingly able to bypass mass
media as a new source of information. There have been many instances of people using
mobile communications in order to express their discontent or frustration with the powers
that be. These same frustrated people have also used mobile communications in order to
form protests and sometimes even flash mobs in order to have a substantial impact.
It allows information to flow through networks more quickly in order for more
people to act. However it can also be used to spread inaccurate information. Based on the
use of wireless communication technology in the ousting of President Estrada, this tool is
extremely beneficial to those who wish to influence and/or change politics. While cell
phones do not replace wired communication methods they do add to and expand the
networks available to activists.
Qualitative research also has several weaknesses. The materials are typically very
anecdotal and rely more on theoretical data than empirical. The majority of these studies
also concentrate on a single case study, which does not prove much worth in determining
the likelihood of replication in other scenarios. Thus there is the need for a research study
using both quantitative and qualitative research across several case studies.
Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Research
The Meta-Activism Project (MAP) is currently working on the Global Digital
Activism Dataset (GDADS) with Clay Shirky, Ethan Zuckerman, and Patrick Meier
serving as advisors. MAP launched in 2010 in order to provide data on digital activism
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activities between 1982 and 2010 to be used for quantitative analysis. They have a threestep process in place. First is the collection of case studies. They are using case studies
from popular press, citizen journalism, and academic journals. Second, they plan to create
a codebook with variable definitions to analyze data across different cases. Currently the
codebook has 72 variables for each case including time, geography, actors, digital
technology used, and strategies. The third step is to request volunteers to help code the
case studies. GDADS is an enormous undertaking and will greatly advance the data
available on the link between digital technology and democratization. GDADS will not,
however, be available until late 2011.235 By the time this dataset is completed there will
most likely be new technologies invented to assist social movements with their
campaigns for democratization, the study will take a huge leap in the research available
to conclude these positive ties.
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The Philippines: How Text Messaging Ousted a President
Case studies are also very important to support my findings. I will start by
observing the occurrences of the Power People II in the Philippines. There have been
several attempts at changing the regime in the Philippines since 1970 including the
movement that forced former President Ferdinand Marcos out of office in 1986. Unlike in
1986, wired and wireless technologies made the 2001 revolution larger in scope and
reach. This four-day revolution occurred from January 17th through the 20th in 2001. It is
named the EDSA Revolution after the street Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, which is
where the crowds originally gathered, or Power People II after the Power People
Movement in 1986.
The background to Power People II is very important. Joseph Estrada served in
the public sector first as mayor for 16 years, then as senator, followed by vice-president
and finally as the 13th President of the Philippines on June 30th, 1998. Estrada won the
presidential election with the strong support of 10.7 million votes.236
From the beginning of his presidency and on, accusations of Estrada’s
involvement in corruption were spreading around the country. Some of these accusations
include accepting bribes, mishandling public funds, and using illegal funds to buy houses
for his mistresses. A friend of President Joseph Estrada accused Estrada and his family
and friends of receiving over 80 million from jueteng, an illegal numbers game, on
October 4th 2000. This was the most serious charge to date. On October 5th Senate
Minority Leader Teofisto Guingona Jr. accused Estrada of taking P70 million on exercise
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tax on cigarettes as well receiving P220 million from Governor Singson from 1998 to
2000.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo resigned from the Cabinet on October
12th before becoming the leader of People Power II.237 Opposition groups filed an
impeachment complaint with House Representatives on October 18th, 2000 before
flocking to the streets of Manila. Within one month over a dozen senior officials,
including the Senate President and House Speaker, withdrew their support. Investigations
began and many house members, including Manila Cardinal Archbishop Jaime Sin, the
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, former Presidents Corazon Aquino and
Fidel Ramos to impeach President Estrada. Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Manuel Villar, read the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate on November 13, 2000.
The Articles of Impeachment was signed by 115 representatives.238 On November 20th
the impeachment trial was formally opened and began on December 7th with Supreme
Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. presiding.239
Five bombs exploded in Mainila killing 22 and injuring over a hundred citizens at
public spaces such as the airport, a train, bus, gas station and park, on December 30th,
2000. This act of violence disrupted the entire country. The Muslim rebel group, Jemaah
Islamiyah, was accused following a police investigation; however, many believed the
violent act was related to Estrada’s impeachment trial.240
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The trial hit a crucial point on January 16, 2001 when the question arose of
whether to open an envelope that contained important evidence that would allegedly
incriminate and sustain the corrupt acts of Estrada. Francisco Tatad, the Senate Majority
Floor Leader, requested a vote to open the envelope. 241 Senators voted 11-10 to keep an
envelope, believed to contain records of Estrada’s transactions, sealed on January 16th,
2001. This infuriated Manila residents. Within hours of the critical meeting for the trial
text messages were sent with instructions to meet at the Shrine at Epifnio de los Santos
Avenue, also known as EDSA, to protest the apparent injustice.242
These crowds were brought together through their disapproval of the
impeachment court. However, had it not been for their text messages and use of another
information technologies, the crowds might not have grown to the extent they were able.
One text message sent out after the voting results were made public stated, “Baboy ang
mga 11 na mga senador! S#%^t, acquitted na si Estrada! Pipol Power na! Pls. pass..."
which translates to “The 11 senators are pigs! S&@t, Estrada is acquitted! Let's do
People Power! Pls. pass...”.243
People Power II lasted four days. On the second day of demonstrations a group of
senator-judges that served on the impeachment trial resigned suspending the case
indefinitely. Two days later the Defense Secretary and Finance Secretary resigned joining
Gloria Arroyo and the other former officials leading the demonstrations. At this point
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Estrada’s cabinet lost several leaders, including having the military side with the
opposition. Estrada appeared on television at 2:00pm to insist that he would not resign.
He reappeared on the television at 6:15pm announcing a presidential election to take
place on May 14th without his name in the running.244 Finally, on January 20, 2001, the
Armed Forces Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff led Estrada out of the Malacanang
Palace. That evening the Supreme Court officially declared the presidency vacant in
order to have Gloria Arroyo sworn in.245
President Estrada was run out of office by angry citizens that were mobilized via
text messages on mobile devices. It was wireless technology that became the “effective
messengers of information.”246 The technology allowed people to mobilize quickly and
efficiently creating a snowball effect towards a common goal. While the Filipinos were
successful without the use of social media in 1986, governments now have a much wider
range of tools at their disposal in order to maintain their position and thus citizens need to
broaden their reach as well in order to be successful.
The two major SMS operators in the Philippines, Smart Communications Inc and
Globe Telecom, transmitted a total of over 115 million text messages each day during
Power People II as opposed to the typical daily average of 24.7 million text messages.247
248

Many people complained there was no signal at EDSA on the days of the revolution

244

Estrada vs Desierto

245

Manuel Castells, et al, The Mobile Communication Society, p. 199.

246

Jennifer Bagalawis, “How IT helped to topple a president.”

247

Michael Bociurkiw, “Revolution by Cell Phone" Forbes,
http://www.forbes.com/asap/2001/0910/028.html.

248

Manuel Castells, et al, p. 200.

88

but these were not simply dead spots. There was no signal because the large masses of
people concentrated in one location were too much for the cell sites to handle.249
The Philippines, similar to other developing nations with liberal trade policies,
has the most up to date technologies while remaining hindered by their failing
infrastructures. While their roads, railroads, postal services, and power continually
worsen, they are able to bypass these obstacles with a mobile phone.
Vincent Rafael, author of The cell phone and the crowd: Messianic politics in the
contemporary Philippines, goes over the three reasons mobile phones have become a
thing of obsession in Manila, Philippines. The first reason was because of the “perennial
difficulty and expense of acquiring land line phone in the Philippines, and the service
provided by the Philippine Long Distance Company (PLDT).”250
The second reason was because of the low costs. Since most people bought
prepaid phone cards to go with their low cost phones (typically $50 in an open market)
the mobile phone would be more affordable than either a wired phone or a computer.251
The third reason for the mobile phone craze was because mobile phones “allow
users to reach beyond traffic-clogged streets and serve as an alternative to slow,
unreliable, and expensive postal service.”252
Other methods of technology were used to mobilize the masses as well. The epetition site E-Lagada.com gathered 91,000 e-signatures. An SMS (text message) poll249

Jennifer Bagalawis, “How IT helped to topple a president.”

250

V. Rafael, “The cell phone and the crowd: Messianic politics in the contemporary
Philippines,” Popular Culture, 15(3): 399-425, 2003, p. 402.

251

Manuel Castells, et al, The Mobile Communication Society, p. 126.

252

V. Rafael, “The cell phone and the crowd: Messianic politics in the contemporary
Philippines,” p. 402-403.

89

taking technology, wpulse.com received 5,157 votes in favor of the impeachment of
Estrada and 475 opposed. The typical methods of communication, radio and television
broadcasts were also used in this revolution.253
Estrada was succeeded by his vice-president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in front
of the crowds. Estrada released a letter stating he had “strong and serious doubts about
the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president” but that he would give
up office to help the nation.254 The world’s reactions to these events were very mixed.
One text message sent after the fall of President Estrada summed it up perfectly,
“CONGRATULATIONS! THANK U 4 UR SUPPORT N DS HSTORICL EVENT.
ERAP WIL GO DOWN N PHIL. HSTORY S BEIN D 1ST PRESIDNT OUSTD BY
TXT.”255
Foreign nations, including the United States recognized Macapagal-Arroyo as a
legitimate president. However, other commentators have described the revolution as “’a
defeat for due process,’ as ‘mob rule,’ as ‘a de facto coup”

256

But as President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo said in her inaugural speech, “advances in information and
communication technology create both peril and opportunity.”257
One question that has surfaced since the Power People II is, why did Estrada not
attempt to prevent the mobilization of people by shutting off mobile communication
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networks? Rafael argues the power of the cell phone was due to the need “to overcome
the crowded conditions and congested surroundings brought about by state’s inability to
order everyday life.”258 As Castells et al. continue, it was the existence of a weak state
prior to the protests that made the mobile phone plays a key role in this situation. Had
there been a stronger state, Castells argues, there would have been a different result.259
Most media channels saw the overthrow of Estrada as positive progress in the
country’s democratization. The mobile phone played a huge role during People Power II
with its ability to disseminate messages, methods of instant communication, mobilize
political demonstrations, and coordinate logistics. While Marcos was able to rule for
nearly two decades after allegations of corruption and human rights violations had been
made, it was only two and a half years into Estrada’s presidency to oust him from his
position. For these above reasons, Helen Andrade- Jimenez claimed that, “People Power
II showed the power of the Internet and mobile communications technology – not to
mention broadcast media – not only to shape public opinion but also to mobilize civil
society when push came to a shove.”260 Given the significantly decreased levels of
violence and military involvement from Power People in 1986, the larger and faster use
of information and communication technologies in the 2001 ousting of President Estrada
did in fact assist the nation in taking a major leap in the process of democratization.261
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Egypt: The Beginning of Democratization
For the second case study, I will explore the recent revolutions in Egypt. While
this situation continues, I feel that we can learn by observing the overall timeline of
events leading up to and during the revolution. After all, as Huntington explained in The
Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, waves of democratization
are often followed with reverse waves. 262 This is not to say that the liberalization which
had occurred during the initial wave was not immense progress. Despite Egypt’s
continual struggle towards consolidation, their revolution and work towards becoming a
fully consolidated democracy is worth reviewing.
The democratization of Egypt through digital medium began years before the
2011 Egyptian revolution. In fact, the 2011 Egyptian revolution was not even the first
time Facebook had been used for civic organizing in Egypt. A strike to fight for better
wages at a state-owned textile factory in Mahalla, Egypt was planned via Facebook in
April 2008. What started as a local strike soon became the “April 6 Youth Movement”
consisting of over 70,000 young and educated Egyptians.263 This movement fought for
the release of journalists from jail, conducted online discussions about government
corruption, and organized protests against President Hosni Mubarak’s diplomatic
relations with Israel during the air strikes against Gaza in December 2008. At this point in
time there were an estimated 12 million Egyptians regularly online along with a projected
160,000 Egyptian bloggers. These numbers increased and within a year there were
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800,000 Egyptian Facebook members making Facebook the third most popular website in
the country. 264
The Egyptian revolution of 2011 began on January 25th. Egyptian citizens,
inspired by the successful Tunisian revolution that forced President Zine al-Abidine Ben
Ali from the office and country, fled to the streets of Cairo’s Tahrir Square to protest the
30-year-old regime that had introduced poverty, unemployment, and corruption. They
were also protesting police brutality, state emergency laws, a lack of free elections,
corruption, and food price inflation. Several Egyptians had been deprived of their basic
needs including education and health care. Almost 40 million people in Egypt were living
under or near the United Nations’ poverty line of $2 a day.265
The demonstrations on the 25th were the largest Egypt had seen in years. These
protests began with a small group of activists handing out flyers on the street. The crowds
grew at an alarming rate once social media tools became involved in spreading the word.
Soon 90,000 people announced that they would attend the demonstrations via Facebook
and Twitter. The protests began in a peaceful manner but soon the protesters began to
attack trucks and throw rocks while being beaten by officers with batons and tear gas.
Many marched to the headquarters of President Hosni Mubarak’s National Democratic
Party.266 By late in the afternoon on the 25th the government blocked access to Twitter in
order to attempt to halt the increasing civil unrest.
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The protests continued and by the 27th the Egyptian government had shut down
Internet access just hours before the largest planned protest.267 Ben Wedeman, a CNN
reporter, confirmed via Twitter, “No internet, no SMS, what is next? Mobile phones and
land lines? So much for stability. #Jan25 #Egypt.”268 Mubarak’s regime cut Internet
access in order to try to prevent dissent from being spread virally. Mubarak understood
that the Internet had assisted the revolutions and assumed cutting access to the Internet
would be enough to stop the revolution from gaining momentum.
On January 28th President Mubarak announced his plans to form a new
government. In his speech he proclaimed, “I have requested the government to step down
today. And I will designate a new government as of tomorrow to shoulder new duties.”269
He acknowledged the citizens’ frustration but gave no indication of stepping down
despite the many requests for him to do so. The protests continued and began to gather
momentum as he set a curfew for Cairo, Alexandria and Suez and deployed the army.270
The Interior Minister and longest serving cabinet member were both replaced. He
kept Defense Minister, Hussein Tantawi, as well as Foreign Minister, Ahmed Aboul
Gheit. Mubarak named his Intelligence Chief, Omar Suleiman, as Vice President, and the
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former Air Force General, Ahmed Shafiq, as Prime Minister.271 Protests continued with
74 people reported dead within two days.272
Light could finally be seen on January 31st as the army announced their
recognition of the "legitimate rights of the people" and their decision not to use force
against the protesters.273
On February first, huge protests took place in Cairo and other large cities after
leaders called for a “march of a million.” It was estimated that hundreds of thousands of
people were in attendance.274 Following the march, in a televised address, President
Mubarak announced that while he did not plan on running for re-election in the upcoming
September election, he also did not have any plans of stepping down.275
After five days without Internet access , the Internet was up and running again in
Egypt on February 2nd, 2011.276 After the army advised protesters to return home, a “Day
of Departure” was called for by Egyptians on February 4th. One Al Jazeera analyst
explained, “the idea is to send a message, and have the largest amount of people
participate.”277 Over 10,000 people showed their support in the streets of Cairo.278 The
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masses of people that showed up on the “Day of Departure” helped force Egypt’s ruling
party to resign from office. Several top leaders stepped down including Gamal Mubarak,
the president’s son, Secretary-General Safwat el-Sharif, as well as the six-member
Steering Committee of the General Secretariat.279 However despite these leaders’
resignations, President Mubarak still would not step down. Labor strikes spread
throughout Egypt for the next few days. Protests also continued, as did Mubarak’s vows
to maintain his position as president.
After 18 days of protests, President Hosni Mubarak stepped down on February
11th, 2011. Vice President Oar Suleiman announced Mubarak’s departure would take
place immediately. The young people of Egypt overturned a regime that lasted three
decades in order to start a new order in the Arab world. President Obama commended
Egyptians on their victory stating, “Egyptians have made it clear that nothing less than
genuine democracy will carry the day.”280
The social media website Facebook was quickly credited with the success of the
uprising. Google Marketing Manager Wael Ghonim played a key role in organizing the
January 25th revolutions on Facebook. Before being imprisoned in Cairo, he reached out
to Egyptian youths via Facebook to gather masses in the streets. In an interview with
CNN, Ghonim argued that Facebook and the Internet were responsible for the uprisings.
He said, “I want to meet Mark Zuckerberg one day and thank him [...] I'm talking on
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behalf of Egypt. [...] This revolution started online. This revolution started on Facebook.
This revolution started [...] in June 2010 when hundreds of thousands of Egyptians started
collaborating content. We would post a video on Facebook that would be shared by
60,000 people on their walls within a few hours. I've always said that if you want to
liberate a society just give them the Internet. [...]”281
Another major contributor to the revolution was Asmaa Mahfouz, founder of the
‘April 6 Youth Movement.’ A week before the initial protest Mahfouz posted a video
advocating for the Egyptian people to meet her at the Tahrir Square to demand
democracy, fight for human rights, and voice their condemnation of Mubarak’s regime.
Mahfouz posted another video chronicling the hard work Egyptians had made to support
her efforts on the day before the first protest. In this video she publicized her intention to
return to Tahrir Square on January 25th. She proclaimed, “Whoever says it is not worth it
because there will only be a handful of people, I want to tell him, 'You are the reason
behind this, and you are a traitor, just like the president or any security cop who beats us
in the streets.”282 While both of these videos first appeared on Facebook, they were soon
transferred to YouTube where they went viral within days. The handful of people
Mahfouz had expected to take part in the protest grew much larger than she originally
expected, in part due to her contribution to the revolution.
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While many Egyptians are still frustrated with the lack of reforms that have taken
place since the revolutions, ten out of the fourteen demands protesters initially made have
been met and the remaining four have been announced. President Mubarak resigned and
will not be running in the upcoming presidential election, the State Security Investigation
Service was disassembled, the recently imposed curfew ended, the SSI-controlled
university-police were removed, Anas el Fiqqi was removed from office, the protesters
demands were publically announced, the NDP was dismantled, and President Mubarak
and his two sons were ordered to stand on trial. Also, it has been announced shop owners
would be reimbursed for losses occurring during curfew, the State of Emergency would
be cancelled, and all revolution prisoners would be released.283
As with the ousting of President Estrada in 2001, the revolutions in Egypt ten
years later were not the product of social media tools. They were brought together by
poor conditions in their countries. Filipinos were fighting injustice of the courts in trying
to get a President impeached. Egyptians, on the other hand, were protesting the entire
government and order in their nation. However, in both instances, the citizens used a new
technology to mobilize citizens of their country in order to voice their opinions to the
reigning government and to bring about a new order in the country.
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Disputing the Dissenters
Just as there are many people that argue social media can help oppressed
inhabitants work towards democratization there are many that argue social media has
hindered the process of democratizing authoritarian regimes. Those that believe social
media hinders rather than assists oppressed citizens argue that cyber-utopianists are
delusional in believing they are assisting revolutions by joining a Facebook group, that
these tools help authoritarian regimes more than the tools help their oppressed, or that the
amount of entertainment found online outweighs any possibility of political actions. For
the following chapter I will delve into seven arguments against social media assisting
democratization and rebut every one of their arguments in order to disprove this
antithesis.
Mary Joyce, the author of Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of
Change, notes there are three different perceptions of the value of digital activism:
optimists, pessimists and persistents.284 In this chapter I will concentrate on the
pessimistic and persistent arguments. Pessimists believe these technologies are used for
censorship purposes, illegal activities, or to create chaos. They believe the technology can
and will be used for destructive purposes. Their views on technology center around fears
of authoritarian regimes’ control over said technology. They look primarily to the aspects
of digital technology that lead to new methods of control, surveillance, and their ability to
empower hackers and terrorists.285
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Pessimistic Arguments
One pessimistic argument against social media assisting democratization is that
the tools produce as much harm as good since repressive governments use the tools to
suppress dissenters.286 Morozov believes social media simply “empowers the strong and
disempowers the weak.”

287

One of his main arguments is that people today are guilty of

being cyber utopians in that they believe that technology empowers the oppressed to
mobilize themselves through different forms of social technologies including text
messages, Facebook, Twitter and any other new technology that is created.288 According
to Morozov, we use faulty assumptions as cyber-utopians and then proceed with
defective methods known as Internet-centrism: alternatively known as the Net
Delusion.289 Morozov claims we need to being using a more realist position.
Morozov prefers us to consider that authoritarian regimes have shown more
complexity and are not about to be outsmarted by tweets.290 As Castells states, “The
Internet is indeed a technology of freedom, but it can make the powerful free to oppress
the uninformed” and “lead to the exclusion of the devalued by the conquerors of
value.”291
Governments are aware of the Internet’s potential for mobilizing individuals in
opposition of the state. The knowledge of this possible effect of the Internet has led
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authoritative figures to pursue controls to manage the information going in and out of
their borders. States have the same access-if not more-social media as protesters. On top
of that the governments also have the power to react when faced with an approaching
revolution. Social media allows for governments to be aware of and police gatherings
before they even begin. Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton explains that these
technologies are being used to exploit human progress and rights. “While they are being
used to organize movements for freedom they are also allowing al-Qaida to create
violence.”292 She mentions that freedom is not simply about one’s right to assemble
without retribution. These new technologies, while they help people, they also create new
censorship opportunities for authoritarian regimes.
In the past, communication systems such as the radio and television allowed
governments to reach out to their citizens with their own nationalistic message. Now
information can travel so fast through several borders that governments have a difficult
time monitoring what goes in and out of their territory. In the digital age distances do not
matter in terms of security. Geographical distance is irrelevant when a person could hack
a computer in one country and affect a computer on the other side of the world. This
worries governments as they begin to lose their power over common citizens.
The Internet has the possibility of becoming a place of civil disobedience.
Andrew Chadwick, a professor of political science at Royal Holloway, University of
London, provides several tactics used to create civil disobedience in his book The
Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics. Some of the tactics he discusses include
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distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, virtual sit-ins where people flood a website
simultaneously, and email bombing where people bombard an inbox with emails.
Andrew Chadwick’s book has a chapter titled The Geopolitics of Internet Control,
which is devoted to censorship sovereignty and cyberspace. He explains how the Internet
was originally intended to be borderless.293 Today counties and companies are teaming
up to filter the information flowing through nations borders. For example, the Internet in
Canada is very different than the Internet in Iran. It is no longer a single Internet that
connects people around the world.
Governments use several different methods in order to censor their citizens. There
are three generations of censorship, which are not mutually exclusive. Countries that are
more authoritarian typically apply more complete control in cyberspace using all three
generations of control. Democratic countries, on the other hand, stick with second and
third generation controls.
The first-generation controls include Internet filtering and policing of cybercafés.
Internet filtering occurs in two different methods. The first is considered address
blocking. A router denies access to a particular IP address or domain name. Address
blocking can be done by either inclusion or exclusion filtering. Inclusion filtering is when
users are only allowed access to sites that are already approved. It could also be done by
exclusion filtering which is when users can access any site except those that are
restricted. The second type of filtering is called content analysis. In this method access is
blocked according to its content such as specific keywords or graphics. Another way
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countries use content filtering is by targeting the local language. As Chadwick’s book
points out, if you are in China and search the phrase “Chinese Labor Party” in Chinese it
is blocked 93 percent of the time. When you search the same phrase in English it is only
blocked 20 percent.294
An immense dilemma is the lack of accountability and transparency in the
censorship by nations filtering practices. There is a large debate occurring over whether a
state’s right to cultural sovereignty or individuals’ right to free information is more
important. Although, many nations won’t even let this debate take place. These nations
won’t admit their methods for filtering nor the nature of their filtering. Some nations,
such as China, block sites and make it appear to be a time-out error on the users end.
Other nations, such as Saudi Arabia, provide the user with an explanation as to why the
site had not been blocked.
The second-generation controls include creating a legal environment for
information control, managing information removal requests, creating technical
shutdowns and computer network attacks. These techniques create the laws and technical
capabilities to deny access to information as needed. These second-generation controls
have both an overt and a covert track. The overt track legalizes content controls by listing
the conditions under which they can be denied. The covert track, alternatively, creates
procedures and the technology to allow content controls to be put in place “just in time”
when the information is at its highest value.295 An example of this is immediately before
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or during a public demonstration. These controls can even be made to look like technical
errors, especially in the case of last minute removal requests.
Third-generation controls focus less on denying access and more on competing
with possible threats by using a counter information campaign that either overpowers or
damages the reputation of adversaries. Third-generation controls include warrantless
surveillance, national cyberzones, state-sponsored information campaigns and direct
action.296
The New York Times featured the article Googling the Censors on September
28th, 2010. This article detailed two tools Google created to monitor governmental
censorship. Google released a tool in May 2010 to allow individuals to monitor
governmental requests to remove content. Then in September 2010 Google released a
new tool that exposes less evident governmental attempts to censor content. This tool was
capable of showing how the traffic on YouTube in Iran literally halted after the
presidential election in 2009. It also shows how the traffic in Libya stopped in January
after videos of demonstrations and partying of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi relatives aired.
This new tool does not show how the traffic was brought to a standstill, just that it was
indeed stopped.297
Internet surveillance is not the only type of censorship involved in social
networking technologies. The surveillance of wireless phone providers is also happening.
The article T-Mobile Claims Right to Censor Text Messages by David Kravets was
featured in Wired News. Kravets discusses the recent court case concerning wireless
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customers and their rights. T-Mobile argued to the New York Federal Court that they
should be able to choose which text messages they deliver. They state that they are
different from wired telephone providers and thus are under different obligations. This is
the first federal case concerning wireless providers censoring text messages.298
However, while both Morozov and Castells have argued the Internet enables
authoritarians to continue oppressing the weak, the Internet is not specifically ‘bad.’ The
Internet, instead, is a neutral tool and only becomes what users make of it. Larry
Diamond, of the Hoover Institution, confirms, “Technology is merely a tool, open to both
noble and nefarious purposes. Just as radio and TV could be vehicles of information
pluaralism and national debate, so they could also be commandeered by totalitarian
regimes for fanatical mobilization and total state control.” 299
A second pessimistic argument is known as the dictator’s dilemma. This argument
believes that an authoritarian regime has a decision to make. They can censor the
Internet, ‘protect’ their citizens, and thus suffer economically since censorship conflicts
with globalization. Or they can open their nation up to globalization as well as the
economic benefits that accompany globalization. As U.S Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton said in her 2010 Internet freedom speech, “Countries that censor news
and information must recognize that from an economic standpoint, there is no distinction
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between censoring political speech and commercial speech. If businesses in your nations
are denied access to either type of information, it will inevitably impact on growth.” 300
The 1985 U.S. Secretary of State, George Schultz, similarly stated, “Totalitarian
societies face a dilemma: either they try to stifle these technologies and thereby fall
further behind in the new industrial revolution, or else they permit these technologies and
see their totalitarian control inevitably eroded.”301
Morozov furthers Clinton and Schultz’s argument by explaining, “Dictators
cannot globalize unless they open up their networks to hordes of international consultants
and investment bankers scouring their lands in search of the next acquisition target.”302
But as Morzov continues, there is not a direct correlation between a nation’s economy
and Internet freedom. Most authoritarian states have adopted the Internet, with North
Korea as an exception. Even China has more Internet users than U.S. citizens. As we are
all aware, China has gone to great lengths to censor its citizens from the rest of the world.
Morozov notes that the dictator’s dilemma assumes that authoritarian regimes had to
choose between using the Internet and completely censoring it. The dilemma does not
take into consideration that there are technologies, such as keyword filtering, that allow
regimes to block specific political activity and allow for Internet activity that supports
and assists economic growth. 303
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It is important to note that this argument makes several assumptions. The
argument first assumes that dictators will decide not to censor their Internet in order to
grow their economies. The argument also assumes that if the regime does use specific
censorship techniques in order to censor specific political discussions and allow for
economic activity then people will not be able to rise up because they won’t have the
means. Finally, the argument assumes that if they do decide to try specific censorship
techniques that citizens will not be able to get around them.
A third pessimistic argument concerns the use of mobile phones for digital
activism. Mobile phones have several benefits for mobilizing people as well as keeping
them updated during a revolution. Phones are cheaper than computers and do not require
as much training. Revolutions in Ukraine, the Philippines, and Indonesia have all used
mobile technology in order to protest against their governments. Evgeny Morozov
discusses several problems with using mobile phones in revolutions. One problem is that
an authoritarian regime can shut down either an entire mobile network or even just the
mobile network for a particular region of the country whenever they deem it necessary.304
One instance of a country shutting down a mobile network was in 2007 when the
Cambodian government declared a “tranquility period.” This included all Cambodian
mobile network operators turning off text messaging for two days. Cambodian authorities
explained this period of time as necessary to keep voters from being “flooded” with
messages regarding the election.305
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Another instance of this occurred in 2009 in Moldova when the government
turned off mobile networks in the capital Chisnau. They did this to hamper any
communication during their local Twitter revolution in order to prevent any uprisings.306
An additional instance of mobile networks being shut off also occurred during the
2006 Color Revolutions in Belarus. The authorities turned off mobile coverage where the
protesters were gathering in order to stop their ability to connect with other protesters as
well as the outside world. In this situation the government argued that they did not shut
off coverage but rather there were too many people using the service that the networks
weren’t able to accommodate the amount of people trying to make calls and send texts at
the same time.307
Another problem with the use of mobile phones in revolutions, according to
Morozov, is that keyword filtering does not extend to text messages. If the authorities
censor text messages they will either simply not be delivered and/or the authors may be
punished for their text messages. The censoring of text messages happened in 2009 in
Azerbaijan when the police punished forty-three people for voting for an Armenian in a
Eurovision contest while Armenia and Azerbaijan were at war over the NagornoKarabach territory. These people were accused of going against national security.308
Yet another issue concerned Western companies providing authoritarian
governments with censorship technology. Morozov mentions that IBM made a deal with
China Mobile in 2010 to provide technology to track (human) social networks as well as
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tracking messaging habits such as who sends text messages and to how many. IBM
argued that this technology was intended to be used in order to help Chinese mobile
companies eliminate spam, not to censor political communications.309
Morozov’s final problem with mobile phones being used for activism is that they
allow people or regimes to track their location. As an example, a U.K.-based company,
ThorpeGlen, brags that they can track “a specific target through ALL his electronic
communications…We can detect change of SIM and change of handset after identifying
one suspect…We can even detect that profile again even if the phone AND SIM are
changed.”310 Because of this, authoritarian regimes can potentially speculate as to where
people could mobilize next.
However despite these issues there are also solutions. Activists and protesters are
not blind to these problems. They are aware of the problems and thus look to loopholes to
work around them. They may buy an unbranded phone without a unique identifier in
order to make their location untraceable. Another solution is to purchase a disposable
prepaid SIM card, which enables activists to change their phone numbers as often as they
wish. However more developed countries, such as Russia and Belarus, require
storeowners to write down the customer’s passport number when they buy a prepaid
card.311
There are several examples of how these social media tools do not aid in
revolutions that are cited by journalists, academics and politicians. Social media in Iran in
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2009 was very one-sided with the majority of Tweets supporting Mir Hossein
Moussavi.312 The Iranian regime did not simply dismiss social media. This regime
understood the benefits of the technology and decided to use text messages to warn
Iranians to stay off the street and away from protests. One message the Intelligence
Ministry sent read, “Dear citizen, according to received information, you have been
influenced by the destabilizing propaganda which the media affiliated with foreign
countries have been disseminating. In case of any illegal action and contact with the
foreign media, you will be charged as a criminal consistent with the Islamic Punishment
Act and dealt with by the Judiciary.”313
It only took a few months for the Iranian government to form a cybercrime team
made up of twelve people in order to find false information, including insults, on Iranian
websites. Once people were found to be spreading either lies or insults they were
arrested.314 The Revolutionary Guard tracked the Green Movement via their online
profiles to shut down the Internet and mobile networks, raid homes, make mass arrests,
and stop Internet-driven protests.315
What is still uncertain, is how many people were tweeting from within Iran about
the protest and whether Twitter was actually used to organize the protest rather than just
describing what was happening. Sysomos, a social media analysis company, reported
312
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there were only19,235 registered Twitter accounts or 0.027 percent of the population in
Iran on the eve of the “Twitter Revolution.”316 Morozov concludes that whether or not
Twitter was being used within Iran to mobilize people, it did prevent the movement from
acting strategically with one mission and one voice.317 This is a common problem with
social media. A benefit of it is that they give the oppressed a voice. The problem is that
those gaining a voice need to remain united in order to accomplish their goal.
The Thai government managed to disperse and kill dozens of protesters during the
uprising of the Red Shirt in Thailand in 2010 after social media savvy protesters occupied
downtown Bangkok.318 In Thailand only one out of five people are online and even fewer
have Twitter accounts. Yet the tweets being written were the same thoughts being
mentioned verbally throughout the country. Protesters were not the only ones using social
media during these protests though. Both sides were using social media, including
Twitter and Facebook, to spread their propaganda messages. Social media was able to
keep both sides of the uprisings informed and to warn people about what areas of the city
had turned violent.
As Mark MacKinnon, a reporter in Bangkok mentioned, “A year ago, we might
have e-mailed our editors to see what the news wires were reporting, or checked a
television set for an update. But in Thailand's fast-moving and violent political crisis,
there was no time to wait for those “old media” to tell us what was going on.”319
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One Thai Internet activist, Poomjit Sirawongprasert, told Mark, “Twitter is the
only place where we can say things freely.”320 In December 2010 political protest
Facebook pages were hacked by Ammar (the authorities that censor the country’s
Internet) in order to steal the passwords of the entire country. In the U.S. an IP address
would be looked at in order to find out who hacked an account but in Tunisia the IP
addresses are reassigned. The country was using a malicious piece of code to record users
login information when they visited sites.
Facebook took a technical approach rather than a political one. Facebook’s chief
security officer Joe Sullivan said, "At its core, from our standpoint, it's a security issue
around passwords and making sure that we protect the integrity of passwords and
accounts. It was very much a black and white security issue and less of a political issue."
In order to fix the problem Facebook first rerouted all Tunisian Facebook requests to an
https server to encrypt the information sent and received. Second, Facebook then required
anyone that logged out and tried to log back in while the malicious code was running to
identify your friends in photos.321
Persistent Arguments
While pessimists believe the digital media will be used for inherently bad
purposes, persistents do not believe digital technologies will have a significant impact on
the world at all. They believe digital technologies won’t change the nature of activism
nor will it change the current political power distribution. One persistent, Marshall Ganz
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(the creator of President Obama’s successful grassroots campaign in 2008) argues that the
digital tools we use are also available offline even if they are slower and more costly.322
One persistent argument against technology assisting democratization is that
social networking tools are ineffective. Malcolm Gladwell in The New Yorker
concentrates on what he refers to as “slacktivism” where casual participants want to
create change through activities such as joining a Facebook group.323 As Evgeny
Morozovo, the author of The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, states,
“…you can’t simply join a revolution any time you want, contribute a comma to a
random revolutionary decree, rephrase the guillotine manual, and then slack off for
months. Revolutions prize centralization and require fully committed leaders, strict
discipline, absolute dedication, and strong relationships based on trust.”324 Morozov
continues “Tweets, of course, don’t topple governments; people do.”325 After all, if “an
authoritarian regime can crumble under the pressure of a Facebook group, whether its
members are protesting online or in the streets, it’s not much of an authoritarian
regime.”326 Morozov argues that the results of digital activism are not typically seen as
long-term goals. Rather, according to him, they are abrupt protests that are the result of a
Facebook group conversation that will be forgotten about as quickly as it began.
Evgeny Morozov is not the only person who has spoken up concerning the ideals
of the Internet. Jon Stewart of The Daily Show has also mocked the idea that the Internet
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can accomplish something even superpower militaries cannot solve in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Stewart jokes, “Why did we have to send an army when we could have
liberated them the same way we buy shoes?”327
Morozov, Stewart, and others, believe the West just wants to be responsible for
the democratic revolutions. Morozov cites Iran’s Twitter Revolution as revealing the
“intense Western longing for a world where information technology is the liberator rather
than the oppressor, a world where technology could be harvested to spread democracy
around the globe rather than entrench existing autocracies.”328 Even former hippies,
Morozov argues, assert that the Internet is doing what then 1960s couldn’t by increasing
democratic involvement and creating newer and stronger communities.329 According to
him, we are just a society that is desperate to believe that we had something to do with
the revolutions occurring miles away from us.
While it is true that revolutions cannot just simply happen whenever one feels like
joining a Facebook group, there are indeed committed individuals and organizations that
use social media effectively. Those fighting in revolutions and dying for what they
believe in goes against the idea that people believe all protesters are fighting by simply
‘Like’-ing a Facebook page. Furthermore, citizens of the West are admittedly joyful
concerning the democratization of other nations. However being interested about a cause
or event and believing you contributed to its success are two separate entities.
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A second persistent argument concerns the digital divide that is occurring both
within countries and internationally. While social media allow for more people to have
access to information and collaboration all over the world there is also the digital divide
which separate users and non-users based on access and skill. Optimists believe the
Internet allows knowledge to transfer to isolated countries and their citizens. These
people believe the Internet is an opportunity for developing nations to take a leap forward
in order to find a place in the global economy. Pessimists, on the other hand, believe that
only the most economically privileged nations and citizens will benefit and progress from
the Internet, and thus causing the under-developed nations and citizens to fall even
further behind in the increasing digital divide. While Hillary Rodhamn Clinton argues the
digital divide between the haves and have-notes has not happened330, one only needs to
look at India to witness a society where the new centers for IT are creating several new
jobs and pushing money into their economy while millions are still deprived of basic
needs.
Yet despite this so-called digital divide, people around the world are finding
methods of overcoming their socio-economic status in order to communicate with family,
neighbors, and even strangers in other countries. Through the use of pre-paid mobile
phones those in a lower economic bracket can afford the luxury of owning a mobile
device without being tied down to an expensive contract. Also the creation of Internet
cafes has allowed individuals and communities without the funds to purchase computer
equipment to surf the Internet.
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A third persistent argument against social networking tools assisting
democratization is the idea that entertainment found on the Internet overpowers any
possibility of political actions. Those in favor of this argument believe the majority of
Internet users primarily are interested in entertainment and consumerism rather than
helping people rise up against their oppressors. Morozov continues this argument by
saying that as a society we lack principles and thus the Internet cannot stimulate our
political awareness enough to fight authoritarianism. He argues that everyone is too busy
shopping online and watching their plasma TVs in order to actually make a difference.331
This argument assumes that we are a society where all people care about is shoes and
sitcoms.
Morozov even goes as far to say that it is naïve to assume that political principles
will come from this “hodgepodge of consumerism, entertainment, and sex.” He believes
the Internet actually makes it harder for people to care about politics since the alternative
is much more entertaining. After all, according to Morozov, any entertainment, even
YouTube, outweighs our drive for political knowledge.332 This argument, while not only
palpably wrong given the 2008 election of U.S. President Obama after a fierce online
campaign, is also offensive.
Some authoritarian countries are even beginning to believe that the entertainment
side of the Internet can work in their favor. If people are too busy searching for the latest
tabloid gossip they will not have the time or the desire to rise up against their
government. Thus governments can use online entertainment as a distraction.
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Unfortunately, this view is not an absolute. The idea of “control by entertainment” will
not work in societies where people are already tired of being oppressed. Entertainment
will not make these people forget about their oppression nor will it change their minds.
Good Samaritans in the West led an experiment in 2007 where volunteers loaned
their computer bandwidth to people in countries with censored Internet through a tool
called Psiphon. They hoped that these strangers would begin to educate themselves
enough to rise up against their oppressive regimes as soon as they witnessed an
uncensored version of the Internet. Forbes Magazine, however, proved that this
experiment had failed given that users searched for “nude pictures of Gwen Stefani and
photos of panty-less Britney Spears.”333 This experiment had several faults though.
Simply giving an uncensored version of the Internet to a stranger in an oppressed country
does not immediately make them want to free themselves. The Internet, as I have stated,
is just a tool, which does not necessarily lead to freedom. A person, or community, needs
to want to liberate him or herself in order for the Internet to provide any benefit. A
revolution does not occur by the idea of the Internet. Revolutions occurs when people are
angry enough about their living conditions that they use what they have available to assist
them in their fight for freedom.
Many journalists, politicians, and academics have also been debating whether or
not social media technologies have any real link to the revolutions that have been
occurring in the Middle East. This is the firth argument against social media assisting
democratization. While they all admit that revolutions did occur and that people were
engaged in social media, they do not believe there was any connection between the two.
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Morozov says just this, “The West, however, wasn’t hallucinating. Tweets did get sent,
and crowds did gather in the streets. This does not necessarily mean, however, that there
was a casual link between the two.”334 He continues arguing that mobilizing the people is
typically the last step in a protest and thus the social media tools do not actually
democratize nations, they simply report about them.335
Within this disconnected argument, he does manage to admit that social media
tools do make it easier to mobilize people. "Cell phones cameras, Facebook,
Twitter…seem…to be making everything happen much faster,” claims Morozov.
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as he continues, “It is easy to mistake quantity for quality.”337 Even if we do believe they
help assist with mobilizing people to overthrow their oppressors, it does not mean it will
lead to the consolidation of democracy. However, as I have mentioned in a previous
chapter, a wave of democratization does not necessarily lead to consolidation. As
Huntington argues, the first two waves of democratization were followed by a reversal
wave.338 So while consolidation does not always occur, the liberalization is a worthwhile
step to be made.
Overcoming Pessimistic and Persistent Arguments
Yet despite the many arguments against social media helping further
democratization, there are still several ways dissidents can overcome these arguments in
order to conceal their activity. While Morozov has mentioned that technologies such as
334
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the Internet and mobile phones help authoritarian regimes, no one can argue they don’t
also help the oppressed. There are several ways for dissidents to conceal their activities.
The first way is to encrypt sensitive data. It has become significantly cheaper in
order for the oppressed to have extra protection against their oppressors. People can now
use voice over IP (VOIP) technologies such as Skype in order to speak to others without
the fear of their conversations being bugged. The failure of governments to listen in on
Skype conversation troubles many governments. The U.S. National Security Agency
offered a cash prize for anyone who could break Skype’s encryption in 2009. According
to Morozov, as of 2010, no winners had been announced.339
A second way dissidents can conceal their activities is due to the immeasurable
amount of data being constantly produced and updated online. Because of the constant
production of new websites and new technology, it is impossible for many authorities to
analyze all of it. Because of the large amounts of data, it takes oppressors a few months
to find the activists’ hideout. By this time the activists may have found a new place to
hide. As Morozov said, “The authorities are much better informed about the parameters
of the haystack, the needle is still quite hard to find.”340
A third way for dissidents to conceal their online actions is through technologies
such as Tor. Tor is a tool that protects users’ anonymity and privacy while surfing the
Internet. It was originally funded by the U.S. Navy but eventually became an independent
project. People are able to protect their privacy by connecting to a random proxy node on
their network and then using the node’s connection to connect to their intended website.
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These types of tools also can be used to evade government censorship. During the 2009
protests, the Iranian government blocked access to many proxies after learning by
Westerners on Twitter of individuals avoiding their keyword censorship techniques.341
Technologies such as Tor are an excellent way for dissidents to conceal their activities, so
long as people are not publicizing such actions for the oppressors to see. Morozov
concludes, “As long as the government doesn’t know these helpers by name, the helpers
don’t know each other, and you frequent enough other networks not to attract attention to
the helpers, you can get away with browsing whatever you want.”342
Despite all the many arguments against why social media cannot or does not
affect the revolutions towards democratization, this new technology is proving that it is a
tool that, if used properly, does assist in the overthrowing of authoritarian regimes.
According to Morozov, “Facebook is to group formation what Red bull is to
productivity.”343 Through creative means such as purchasing pre-paid mobile phones,
using software to conceal their activities, and by proving arguments wrong by standing
up for political participation rather than succumbing to the latest video of a cat playing
the piano on YouTube, people around the world are disproving these arguments and
asserting that they do not hold validity in the international affairs arena.
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Conclusion
The availability of suitable digital networking tools is a necessary, but not
sufficient, cause of democratization and regime change. There needs to be the
combination of infrastructure conditions and contextual circumstances to allow for either
a democratic transition or democratic entrenchment to occur. These tools allow
individuals a greater extent of power than they have held in the past. This allows them to
have a greater say in their nation and government. In authoritarian countries this could
mean the beginning of a democratic transition.
Social movements do not just use new information and communication
technologies to learn about democratization strategies of other nations. ICTs are also
utilized to sustain a movement, to improve the justice system, to give strength to
opposition political parties, to have fair elections, and to create a new sense of
transparency within the regime. Thus, as Howard argues, “It is safe to assert that there is
a close casual connection between information infrastructure and contemporary
democratization.”344
Once the political or social movement has begun, individuals must determine the
type of metrics to employ in order measure their success. In Measuring the Success of
Digital Campaigns, Dave Karpf discusses two different types of metrics that can be used
in digital activism: tactical and strategic.345 While tactical metrics count specific numbers
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such as visits to a website, blog posts, Facebook friends, they only provide how many
individuals have taken a form of action towards your campaign.
Alternatively, strategic metrics measure actual success. Strategic metrics require
the activists to establish what their goals are as well as how they plan on determining
their success or failure. Since various campaigns have different desired results they also
have distinctive meanings of the terms “influence,” “power,” and “success.” As a result
strategic metrics are more difficult to determine. Individuals need to question how they
will know when they have achieved their goal.346
As an example, David Faris, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, has
researched the use of digital media in Egypt. His findings show that while Egypt has a
low Internet-adoption rate, Egyptians are greatly influenced by political bloggers.347 He
believes the key is to create relationships with the independent media as well as four
other types of activities that enhance the media: breaking stories that typically go
unnoticed; documenting with a distinctive text, photos, or videos; sending stories to an
international audience; and “red-lining” where bloggers speak about topics that are illegal
for the Egyptian media. Unfortunately, as Faris mentions, these activities are hard to
recognize using tactical metrics typically used in the United States such as traffic
rankings, hyperlink analysis, and link click-throughs. Therefore instead Faris uses
interviews and case analysis to determine the importance of the Internet in Egypt.
Through his research Faris determined that Egyptian bloggers have reported on key news
stories such as the persecution of Sudanese refugees, sexual harassment in the streets of
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Cairo, and police brutality stories.348 These news stories would have been disregarded
had it not been for the bloggers reports. Faris concludes that small groups of Egyptian
digital activists continually mobilize and coordinate activities to change government
actions.
Tactical metrics are also very contextual. They attempt to make the success of a
specific campaign, using a specific tool, with a particular audience. Many people attempt
to reproduce these strategies yet it is also impossible since the context of campaigns is
continually changing even within the same country. As an example, the online
mobilization in Egypt was successful for the April 6 strike in 2008. Yet in 2009, using the
same tactics, mobilizing other Egyptians failed.349
And yet, despite the inadequacy of tactical metrics, digital activism still heavily
relies on it since we do not yet have a set of analytical tools to use in different contexts.
Hence, for the time being, many activists believe we must use our knowledge of tactics
that work offline and attempt to apply them to digital activism.
We need to work to increase our strategic knowledge of digital activism rather
than depend on the assumption that it is simply an extension of offline activism. The lack
of our strategic knowledge can be extremely limiting, for without this knowledge it is
impossible to understand all potential actions and reactions. With a better comprehension
of digital activism, activists can create effective campaigns with a higher success rate of
accomplishing their goals.
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In my first chapter I discussed the definition and history of democratization and
explained that there is not currently, and might not ever be a universally accepted
definition of democracy. Despite this, most scholars and politicians agree that political,
social and economic equality and freedom are some of the most important characteristics
of a democratic regime. Furthermore, I explained Huntington’s waves including his
reversal waves to justify how democratization does not always lead to consolidation or
entrenchment. It could encounter frequent reversals as in Argentina. Yet despite the
reverse waves, in which Huntington believed was “a two-step-forward, one-stepbackward pattern,” democratization did progress either with full out democratic
consolidation or simply liberalization.350 We need to think of the process towards
democratization and the countries involved as more or less democratic since it is
important to that democratization is not an ending result, but rather a process all
democratic regimes must participate in.
My second chapter reviewed the history of information and communication
technologies beginning with the invention of ARPANET (and later the Internet), leading
to mobile devices, and concluding with social media websites. These technologies are
now embedded in our societies to the point where they can be used for anything from
checking the morning news, to creating news by overthrowing an authoritarian regime.
Mark Zuckerberg did not invent Facebook in order to help citizens rise up against
authoritarian regimes. Nor did Jack Dorsey construct Twitter with this idea in mind.
Nevertheless these tools are indeed used for that purpose.
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As I discussed in chapter three, it is important to first identify the economic,
social, political, and infrastructural factors of the environment before we can explain why
digital revolutions occur in some countries versus others. I reviewed the different
combinations of infrastructural and contextual conditions that have a possibility of
leading to social unrest and possibly democratic transitioning or entrenchment. Finally I
analyzed Philip Howard’s research results, which found that the two most outstanding
sufficient causes of democratic transition both include an active online society. Whereas
having a small population is the main solitary cause with the best-case coverage. As for
democratic entrenchment, Howard’s study found that a well-developed ICT infrastructure
along with not being dependent on fuel exports is a sufficient cause.351 After we have
examined the environment in which digital activists operate we can then discuss the
different possible methods of digital activism.
Chapter four reviews the different quantitative and qualitative evidence on the ties
between digital media and democratization. The first section of this chapter offered
research involving quantitative analysis by Kedzie, Best and Wade, Howard, and
Castells. The second section provided a review of qualitative studies, in particular,
concerning R. Kelly Garrett’s article Protest in an information society: A review of
literature on social movements and new ICTs. Yet a primarily qualitative or quantitative
study is severely limited. Quantitative studies typically lack enough data to make a full
analysis given the recent events in the Middle East and the recent creation of several
technologies. Qualitative studies lack empirical data and typically rely too heavily on
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anecdotal evidence. Through the combination of qualitative and quantitative data the
Global Digital Activism Dataset will greatly advance the data available on the link
between digital technology and democratization by the end of 2011.
I continue my thesis by exploring case studies in chapters five and six in order to
identify the successful tactics so that those methods can be replicated in other scenarios
with similar contexts. While most scholars agree that case studies are not sufficient to
rely upon, they are still important for our understanding of digital activism since it is still
a relatively new practice and thus there is little information and even less data that has
been analyzed concerning the topic.
The first case study I reviewed concerns the Power People II in the Philippines in
2001. Unlike the original Power People movement in 1986, wired and wireless
technologies made the 2001 revolution larger in scope and reach.

This four-day

revolution resulted in the ousting of President Estrada from office. The mobile phone
played a huge role during People Power II with its ability to disseminate messages,
methods of instant communication, mobilize political demonstrations, and coordinate
logistics. Given the significantly decreased levels of violence and military involvement
from Power People in 1986, the larger and faster use of information and communication
technologies in the 2001 ousting of President Estrada did in fact assist the nation in
making great progress in the process of democratization.352
For the second case study, I explored the recent revolutions in Egypt in chapter
six. While this situation continues, I feel it was important to observe the overall timeline
of events leading up to and during the revolution. After all, as Huntington explained in
352
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The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, waves of
democratization are often followed with reverse waves.

353

This is not to say that the

liberalization which had occurred during the initial wave was not immense progress.
Despite Egypt’s continual struggle towards consolidation, their revolution and work
towards becoming a fully consolidated democracy is worth reviewing.
As with the ousting of President Estrada in 2001, the revolutions in Egypt ten
years later were not the product of social media tools. They were brought together by
poor conditions in their countries. Egyptians protested the thirty-year regime responsible
for their living conditions. The citizens used a new technology to mobilize citizens of
their country in order to voice their opinions to the reigning government and to bring
about a new order in the country.
Unfortunately, just as there are many people that argue social media can help
oppressed inhabitants work towards democratization there are many others that dispute
social media has hindered the process of democratizing authoritarian regimes. Those that
believe social media impedes rather than assists oppressed citizens argue that cyberutopianists are delusional in deeming they are assisting revolutions by joining a Facebook
group. Their belief that these tools help authoritarian regimes more than their oppressed,
or that the amount of entertainment found online outweighs any possibility of political
actions is ignores the concept that the Internet is simply a neutral tool to be used as one
sees fit.
In this chapter I reviewed the pessimistic and persistent arguments against the ties
between ICTs and democratization. Pessimists believe ICTs are used for censorship
353
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purposes, illegal activities, or to create chaos. They claim that technology can and will be
used for destructive purposes. Persistents, on the other hand, emphasize that technology
does not enhance or hinder democratization based on its neutral status.
Yet despite the many arguments I set forth in chapter seven against ICTs helping
further democratization, there are still several ways dissidents can overcome these
arguments in order to conceal their activity. Activists can encrypt sensitive data or use
voice over IP (VOIP) technologies such as Skype in order to speak to others without the
fear of their conversations being bugged. Also because of the constant production of new
websites and new technology, it is typically impossible for authorities to analyze all of it.
A third way for dissidents to conceal their online actions is through technologies such as
Tor, that protects users’ anonymity and privacy while surfing the Internet or evade
government censorship.
Despite the many arguments against why social media cannot or does not affect
the revolutions towards democratization, these new ICTs are continually proving that it is
a tool that, if used properly, does assist in the overthrowing of authoritarian regimes.
Through creative means such as purchasing pre-paid mobile phones, using software to
conceal their activities, and by proving arguments wrong by standing up for political
participation people around the world are disproving these arguments and asserting that
they do not hold validity in the international affairs arena. To paraphrase the Chinese
activist Xiao Oiang, since the fate of digital activism is still uncertain idealists must take
action.354
Of course, this is not to say there is only one path to democratization nor is it to
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say that ICT’s alone cause political change. It is purely to say that information and
communication technologies provide the capacity to create political or social change. It
is, however, safe to say that an effective social movement today includes the use of ICTs
and that democratization is not possible without some use of these technologies. As
Howard accurately states, “Protests and activist movements have led to successful
democratic insurgencies, insurgencies that depended on ICTs for the timing and logistics
of protest. Sometimes democratic transitions are the outcome, and sometimes the
outcome is slight improvement in the behavior of authoritarian states.”
With these new digital technologies, individuals now have the potential to be
better educated, communicate easier, and cooperate more efficiently than ever before. We
also have the capability to create global change. Yochai Benkler, a Harvard Professor,
argued in his book, The Wealth of Networks, that more people will be engaged if there is
a low time commitment and lost cost.355 Digital activism has the capability of doing just
that. With improving our strategic knowledge of the field we can enhance this new
medium in order to see new political and power structures forming in nations around the
world.
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